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Notes 
TO ENHANCE OR NOT TO ENHANCE:  CIVIL 
PENALTY ENHANCEMENT FOR PARENTS OF 
JUVENILE HATE CRIME OFFENDERS 
No one is born hating another person because of the colour of 
his skin, or his background, or his religion.  People must learn 
to hate, and if they can learn to hate, they can be taught to 
love, for love comes more naturally to the human heart than 
its opposite.1   
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Mr. and Mrs. Smith are firm believers in their pro-choice stance on 
abortion.2  Together they attend rallies to actively torment pro-life 
Catholics.  They allow their seventeen-year-old daughter, Hannah, to 
participate in the rallies and express her hatred through violent action. 
At a pro-life rally, Hannah grabbs a girl’s neck, throws her to the 
ground, and stabbs her in the chest with a knife.  Hannah leaves the girl 
on the ground where she is later discovered and saved by a passerby.  
Afterwards, the girl and other Catholics purposely conceal their faith. 
In an unrelated incident, local homosexuals fear for their safety and 
intentionally hide their sexuality because of sixteen-year old James 
Jenkins.  Purposefully targeting another boy because of his sexual 
preference, James strangles the boy, drags him by his neck, and attempts 
to hang him.  Unlike Hannah, James learns to hate homosexuals from his 
friends, and not his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Jenkins.   
At their trials, the juries find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Hannah’s and James’s crimes were motivated by hatred for Catholics 
and homosexuals, respectively.  State law allows for a penalty 
enhancement for such “hate crimes,” and Hannah and James were 
sentenced accordingly.  
Following Hannah’s and James’s convictions for hate crime, the 
victims file civil suits against the juveniles’ parents pursuant to the 
                                                 
1 THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 493 (Elizabeth Knowles ed., Oxford Univ. 
Press 5th ed. 1999) (quoting Nelson Mandela’s Long Walk to Freedom). 
2 Although this situation is fictional, it presents an introduction to the topics and legal 
issues discussed in this Note. 
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state’s parental liability law.  To encourage parents to supervise their 
children, this law holds parents liable for damages resulting from their 
juveniles’ willful and wanton conduct up to $4,000. 
The victims’ attorneys argue for a civil penalty enhancement against 
Hannah’s and James’s parents because the crimes were motivated by a 
bias against Catholics and homosexuals.  In support of their argument, 
the attorneys urge that the penalty enhancement reflects the severity of 
Hannah’s and James’s hate crimes.  Second, the attorneys contend that 
the increased penalty would encourage the parents to exert more 
supervision and control over Hannah and James, leading to a decrease in 
juvenile hate crime.   
Finally, the victims’ attorneys argue that juveniles possess a 
diminished responsibility, and that the juvenile offenders’ parents 
should be held more accountable for their hate crimes.  But the court 
rejects the attorneys’ arguments, holding that current parental liability 
laws do not allow for the application of civil penalty enhancements to 
the parents of juvenile hate crime offenders.  
Laws that subject offenders to increased punishments show 
recognition by legislatures that hate crimes are distinct from other 
violent crimes.3  Similarly, parental liability laws indicate legislative 
intent to encourage parents to supervise juveniles, and suggest that 
parental failure to keep juveniles from committing crimes may be a 
legitimate basis to expose parents to liability.4 
But the best way to combat hate crime, as opposed to other types of 
juvenile crime, would be a combination of enhanced penalty and 
parental liability laws, particularly where the law already provides for 
additional criminal punishment for hate crime offenders.5  In particular, 
an enhanced penalty for the parents of juvenile hate crime offenders 
would reflect criminal law’s treatment of hate crime as distinct from 
other violent crime.6  Similarly, the threat of an additional penalty would 
further encourage parents to supervise juveniles to prevent crime—hate 
                                                 
3 See infra Part II.A.3 (detailing the three different types of hate crime legislation). 
4 See infra Part II.D (explaining the purpose of parental liability statutes). 
5 See infra Part IV (adding a sentence enhancement feature to existing parental liability 
laws for parents of a juvenile hate crime offender). 
6 See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (defining penalty enhancement statutes 
and indicating which states have a penalty enhancement for hate crime offenders). 
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crime in particular—thus increasing the effectiveness of current parental 
liability laws.7 
Part II of this Note begins with a broad overview of hate crime, 
penalty enhancement statutes, juvenile delinquency, and parental 
liability laws.8  Next, Part III of this Note analyzes the application of a 
civil penalty enhancement to the parents of juvenile hate crime 
offenders.9  Finally, Part IV adds a civil penalty enhancement to existing 
parental liability laws for parents of juvenile hate crime offenders.10  The 
enhanced penalty will reduce hatred by providing parents with an 
opportunity to learn acceptance, teach acceptance to their children, and 
improve parenting skills.  Thus, a reduction of this learned behavior will 
decrease the overall number of hate crimes committed by adults and 
most importantly juveniles, who would maintain and continue to act 
upon a particular hatred without the enhanced penalty.  
II.  AN OVERVIEW OF HATE CRIME, PENALTY ENHANCEMENT STATUTES, 
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, AND PARENTAL LIABILITY LAWS 
A review of hate crime, penalty enhancement statutes, juvenile 
delinquency, and parental liability laws demonstrates a critical problem 
faced by victims of juvenile hate crime:  current parental liability laws 
inadequately address the origins of this learned behavior and reflect the 
severity of hate crimes.11  Part II.A exemplifies these inadequacies 
through an exploration of the nature of hate crime, federal and state 
statutes, and relevant constitutional challenges to the laws.12  Part II.B 
explains the concept of penalty enhancements and the constitutional 
challenges to increased sentences, while Part II.C examines the 
prevalence of juvenile delinquency, the jurisdiction of juvenile justice 
                                                 
7 See infra Part IV.A (explaining the possible additional penalties for parents of juvenile 
hate crime offenders). 
8 See infra Part II (showing that hate crime is inherently more severe than ordinary 
crime, as recognized through enhanced penalty statutes, however, the overview indicates 
that current parental liability laws do not reflect the same mentality, even though juveniles 
are common hate crime offenders). 
9 See infra Part III (analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of hate crime legislation and 
parental liability laws as they apply to parents of juvenile hate crime offenders). 
10 See infra Part IV (presenting the additional penalty for parents of juvenile hate crime 
offenders). 
11 See infra Part II (providing an overview of hate crime, penalty enhancement statutes, 
juvenile delinquency, and parental liability laws); infra Part IV (proposing the addition of a 
sentence enhancement feature to existing parental liability laws). 
12 See infra Part II.A (describing hate crime as inherently more violent than other violent 
crime because of the increased effects on victims and society). 
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systems, and theories of juvenile misconduct.13  Finally, Part II.D 
presents various forms of legislation that hold parents accountable and 
relevant constitutional challenges to parental liability laws.14 
A. The Background of Hate Crime 
As the victims of a hate crime, Hannah’s and James’s victims suffer 
severe psychological and physical effects, even when compared to the 
victims of other violent crimes.15  Accordingly, various forms of hate 
crime legislation may punish Hannah and James solely because their 
crimes were committed because of a bias.16  Part II.A.1 provides a broad 
overview of hate crime and Part II.A.2 explains that the effects of hate 
crimes on the victims and society are inherently more severe compared 
to the impacts of other violent crime.17  Finally, Part II.A.3 presents 
various forms of federal and state hate crime legislation.18 
1. The Nature of Hate Crime 
A hate crime is a crime committed against a victim who is selected 
out of hatred for a particular “race, religion, sexual orientation, or 
ethnicity.”19  It is described as a “doubly depraved act” because of the 
                                                 
13 See infra Part II.B (indicating that states allow an increase in hate crime offenders’ 
sentences because of the severity of a hate crime); infra Part II.C (demonstrating the 
necessity for parental liability laws which protect victims of juvenile crime from juveniles 
unable to satisfy a judgment). 
14 See infra Part II.D (discussing how challenges to parental liability laws will likely be 
unsuccessful because such laws do not violate the Equal Protection or Due Process clauses 
nor are they overbroad). 
15 See infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text (stating that the increased effects on hate 
crime victims include suppressing religious beliefs, decreased self-esteem, and isolating 
victims). 
16 See infra Part II.A.3 (presenting legislation that provides a punishment for hate crime 
offenders). 
17 See infra Part II.A.1 (indicating that hate is passed on through generations and that 
juveniles are common hate crime offenders); infra Part II.A.2 (explaining that the victim is 
more likely to suffer increased psychological harm and the community is more likely to 
fear victimization after hate crime). 
18 See infra Part II.A.3 (providing the text of current bills in the House of Representatives 
as well as the three forms of hate crime legislation: penalty enhancement statutes, new 
crime laws, and civil rights statutes). 
19 Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-275, § (b)(1), 104 Stat. 140 (1990).  
An offense committed in Salem, Oregon provides an example of a hate crime.  Lori A. 
Spillane, Hate Crime: Violent Intolerance, PROSECUTOR, 1995, at 20, 22.  Three members of a 
group known as the “American Front” targeted, fire-bombed, and killed Hattie Cohens, an 
African-American lesbian, and her roommate, Brian Mock, a gay white man.  Id.  IND. CODE 
§ 10-13-3-1 (2005) defines a bias crime as: 
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act’s discriminatory motivation and the inherent violence in such an 
attack.20  Humans more easily accept others that possess similar, if not 
the same, characteristics as themselves.21  As a result, firmly rooted 
elements of human society—hatred and prejudices—have been passed 
from generation to generation, and tension, distrust, and hatred exist 
among individuals against groups that possess different traits.22  Hate 
crime occurs when these biases are expressed through violent action.23  
                                                                                                             
[A]n offense in which the person who commits the offense knowingly 
or intentionally: (1) selected the person who was injured; or (2) 
damaged or otherwise affected property; by the offense because of the 
color, creed, disability, national origin, race, religion, or sexual 
orientation of the injured person or of the owner or occupant of the 
affected property or because the injured person or owner or occupant 
of the affected property was associated with any other recognizable 
group or affiliation. 
Id.; see In re Christopher M., 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61, 68 (Ct. App. 2005) (convicting a juvenile of 
a hate crime after the minor taped his friends robbing a Hispanic man at gunpoint, 
thereafter admitting that the crime was motivated by hate).  For the purpose of this Note, 
the term “hate crime” is broad and is synonymous with bias-motivated crime, ethnic 
intimidation, malicious harassment, and malicious intimidation.  See also Steven Bennett 
Weisburd & Brian Levin, “On the Basis of Sex”: Recognizing Gender-Based Bias Crimes, 5 STAN. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 21 (1994) (arguing that gender should not be included, but in a separate 
category of bias crimes); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HATE CRIME DATA COLLECTION GUIDELINES 
1, 2 (Oct. 1999), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/hatecrime.pdf [hereinafter HATE 
CRIME DATA] which defines a hate crime as a bias crime.  A “bias crime” is further defined 
as one that is “[a] criminal offense committed against a person or property which is 
motivated, in whole or in part, by the offender’s bias against a race, religion, disability, 
sexual orientation, or ethnicity/national origin; also known as Hate Crime.”  HATE CRIME 
DATA, supra, at 2. 
20 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 20-1, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1994) (No. 
92-515).  The brief explains that the defendant’s attack on the victim was wrong because of 
the violence; however, the act was also punishable because of the defendant’s 
discriminatory motive.  Id.; see infra note 75 and accompanying text (further describing the 
case of Wisconsin v. Mitchell where the Court upheld Wisconsin’s hate crime penalty 
enhancement statute). 
21 Craig L. Uhrich, Comment, Hate Crime Legislation: A Policy Analysis, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 
1467, 1497 (1999). 
22 Robert J. Boeckmann & Carolyn Turpin-Petrosino, Understanding the Harm of Hate 
Crime, 58 J. SOC. ISSUES 207 (2002); Uhrich, supra note 21, at 1497.  However, more exposure 
to the hated characteristic may help eliminate negative attitudes toward that trait.  Id.  
Familiarity breeds acceptance and reduces hate.  Id.; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 
42.014(b) (2006) (requiring a hate crime offender to attend educational classes to develop 
tolerance and acceptance of others who possess different characteristics). 
23 HATE CRIME DATA, supra note 19, at 7-8.  There is an important distinction between a 
hate crime and an ordinary crime.  Id. at 4.  To be a hate crime, the offense must have been 
motivated by a particular characteristic, but the simple fact that a victim possessed a 
particular characteristic is insufficient to categorize the crime as hate crime.  Id.  Evidence 
such as bias-related drawings, comments at the scene of the crime, or different 
characteristics between the victim and offender, are objective indicia of a hate crime.  Id. at 
5.  One example is if a group of Caucasian individuals assaulted a black individual while 
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Among minors, who are arrested for a minimum of at least half of bias 
related offenses, 24 hate crime commonly occurs when young individuals 
transform radical beliefs into violent acts.25  Organized groups also 
commit hate crimes, but the frequency of hate crimes within organized 
groups as compared to individual offenses is uncertain.26  But regardless 
of the identity of the offender, throughout the past century this nation 
has experienced a vast number of heinous and widely publicized hate 
crimes that have had a severe impact on not only the victims, but society 
as well.27 
                                                                                                             
the individual passed through a predominately white residential neighborhood and 
witnesses stated that the individual was attacked because of his race.  Id. at 8.  Conversely, 
a lack of objective factors precludes the following situation from being categorized as a hate 
crime.  Id. at 7.  For example, a white juvenile took a purse from a Jewish woman, pushed 
her over, and made a derogatory statement against Jews.  Id.  However, little was known 
about the offender’s beliefs and if his motivation was purely to steal the purse or was 
motivated because the victim was Jewish.  Id.; see James B. Jacobs & Kimberly A. Potter, 
Hate Crimes: A Critical Perspective, 22 CRIME & JUST. 1, 20-29 (1997) (providing a definition 
and examples of other bias motivated crimes such as anti-black, anti-ethnic, and anti-
female). 
24 Spillane, supra note 19, at 22.  More specifically, there is evidence indicating that 
young males commit more hate crimes than young females.  Cynthia R. Clausen, 
Addressing Juvenile Hate Crimes in Kentucky, 8 KY. CHILD. RTS. J. 19 (2000); Kristine Olson, 
The Government and the Community: A Coordinated Response to Hate Crime in America, 45 FED. 
LAW. 47 (1998); see Annie Steinberg et al., Youth Hate Crimes: Identification, Prevention, and 
Intervention, 160 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 979, 979 (2003) (noting that youth and juveniles 
constitute an overwhelming number of hate crime offenders).  However, Steinberg admits 
that evidence is limited due to “the lack of definitive data collection” on juvenile hate crime 
offenders.  Steinberg, supra, at 980.  The absence of data is attributable to the states that do 
not include the ages of hate crime offenders in data reports.  Id.  Evidence on adult hate 
crime offenders indicates that an individual with a criminal history is more likely to 
commit more severe hate crime.  Id. at 984.  Perpetrators of violent hate crime likely have a 
difficulty with substance abuse and are “economically marginalized.”  Id.  However, there 
is a lack of definitive data to conclude that an adult hate crime offender is from a particular 
socioeconomic status, faith, or ethnicity.  Id.  But see Megan Sullaway, Psychological 
Perspectives on Hate Crime Laws, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 250, 277 (2004) (referencing 
data from the Los Angeles Police Department that ran contrary to the notion that juveniles 
are the most common offenders of hate crimes). 
25 Steinberg, supra note 24, at 989.  Such acts of violence from extremist ideas may be 
motivated by thrill and retaliation.  Sullaway, supra note 24, at 277. 
26 Spillane, supra note 19, at 20.  Organized groups committed to prejudice include the 
Ku Klux Klan, the Order, White Aryan Resistance, and groups of skinheads.  Jacobs & 
Potter, supra note 23, at 29.  These groups “recruit white males, women and children who 
have not realized their American dream.”  Clausen, supra note 24, at 19. 
27 See James W. Clarke, Without Fear or Shame: Lynching, Capital Punishment and the 
Subculture of Violence in the American South, 28 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 267, 270 (1998) (explaining 
the brutal murder of Henry Lowry who was set on fire while still breathing); Kristen M. 
Jasket, Note, Racists, Skinheads and Gay-Bashers Beware: Congress Joins the Battle Against Hate 
Crime by Proposing the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1999, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 509, 511 
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2. The Effect of Hate Crime on Victims and Society 
Hate crime has effects on both victims and society that are absent in 
other violent crime.28  First, the commission of hate crime has serious 
consequences for victims.29  Specifically, hate crime offenders target 
                                                                                                             
(describing the grotesque murder of James Byrd, Jr. who was beaten, chained, and dragged 
to death, and had his arms and head detached from his body solely because of his race); 
Uhrich, supra note 21, at 1468 (discussing the October 7, 1998 death of Matthew Shepard, 
who was beaten by two men in Laramie, Wyoming, after finding out that Matthew was 
gay). 
28 Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can Words Increase Your 
Sentence?  Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 UCLA L. REV. 
333, 340 (1991); see Boeckmann & Turpin-Petrosino, supra note 22, at 209 (noting empirical 
research that demonstrates the “impact of hate crime victimization exceeds that of ordinary 
crime victimization”).  A hate crime victim is more likely to be beaten, tortured, and 
hospitalized than a victim of a general, unbiased violent crime.  Heidi M. Hurd & Michael 
S. Moore, Punishing Hatred and Prejudice, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1081, 1085 (2004); Weisburd & 
Levin, supra note 19, at 23.  However, Hurd and Moore urge that the argument that hate 
crime results in greater physical injury is flawed.  Hurd & Moore, supra, at 1085.  The 
authors fail to see a justification for an enhanced punishment based on an increased injury 
because it uses the “defendant’s hate/bias motivation as a proxy for a victim’s greater 
harm—and not as an indication of the defendant’s culpability.”  Id. at 1086.  Hate crimes 
stigmatize victims who subsequently manifest a belief in the stereotype and experience 
deterioration in self worth.  Id.; see Boeckmann & Turpin-Petrosino, supra note 22, at 218 
(noting that penalty enhancement laws are necessary because “of the unique harms 
assumed to be created by crimes motivated by hate”).  Increased psychological harm 
includes decreased self-esteem, lowered sense of security, and decreased trust.  Hurd & 
Moore, supra, at 1087; Scott D. McCoy, The Homosexual-Advance Defense and Hate Crime 
Statutes: Their Interaction and Conflict, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 629, 650-52 (2001).  Again 
opponents reject this argument because all violent crimes cause the victim to suffer 
psychological trauma.  Hurd & Moore, supra, at 1087.  Further empirical studies attempt to 
demonstrate a greater psychological harm from hate crime but the studies do not directly 
compare the trauma of victims of a hate motivated assault to the trauma of assault victims.  
Id. at 1088. 
29 State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558, 563 (Or. 1992).  The court referenced the legislative 
history of the Oregon hate crime statute and stated that in enacting the statute: 
[T]he legislature determined that the potential for harm is greater 
when . . . causing physical injury to a victim because of the perception 
that the victim belongs to one of the specified groups creates a harm to 
society distinct from and greater than the harm caused by the assault 
alone.  Such crimes—because they are directed not only toward the 
victim but, in essence, toward an entire group of which the victim is 
perceived to be a member—invite imitation, retaliation, and insecurity 
on the part of persons in the group to which the victim was perceived 
by the assailants to belong.  Such crimes are particularly harmful, 
because the victim is attacked on the basis of characteristics, perceived 
to be possessed by the victim, that have historically been targeted for 
wrongs.  Those are harms that the legislature is entitled to proscribe 
and penalize by criminal laws. 
Id. at 563-64; see Uhrich, supra note 21, at 1507 (discussing the psychological effects of hate 
crime on victims); infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the enactment of penalty enhancing statutes 
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victims because of a particular sexual preference, religious belief, or an 
immutable characteristic beyond the victims’ control, such as skin 
color.30  As a result, victims may experience a decreased sense of self 
worth or identity.31  Further, victims receive the message that their 
presence in a community is unacceptable, and in response, often 
suppress their beliefs.32  Ultimately, hate crime isolates its victims from 
society because friends and acquaintances may refuse to associate with 
the victims for fear of their own safety.33   
In addition to its significant effects on victims, hate crime imposes 
even greater effects on the community.34  Hate crime promotes 
retaliation by groups that possess the targeted characteristic, thus 
making revenge a goal of the targeted group.35  Hate crime also 
                                                                                                             
because of the effect that hate crime has on victims and society to warrant an increased 
penalty when the crime is motivated by hate for a particular characteristic). 
30 Gellman, supra note 28, at 340; McCoy, supra note 28, at 652; Weisburd & Levin, supra 
note 19, at 24; see In re Joshua H., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291, 299-300 (Ct. App. 1994) (emphasizing 
the effects that targeting an immutable characteristic has on the victim). 
31 Gellman, supra note 28, at 340; Weisburd & Levin, supra note 19, at 23; see Michael S. 
Degan, Comment, “Adding the First Amendment to the Fire”: Cross Burning and Hate Crime 
Laws, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1109, 1113 (1993) (discussing the psychological effects, such as 
“high blood pressure, sleep disorders, post-traumatic stress disorders, [and] hypertension” 
that hate crime has on victims). 
32 Degan, supra note 31, at 1113.  Hate crime offenders threaten a victim’s sense of safety 
because the victims targeted characteristic is likely permanent.  Uhrich, supra note 21, at 
1506.  A threatened sense of safety has caused some victims to take action such as moving 
to another community so that they are not as noticeable.  Sullaway, supra note 24, at 264; see 
Boeckmann & Turpin-Petrosino, supra note 22, at 209.  Examples of messages sent to 
victims by offenders include “I don’t like you gays” and “[y]ou Jews will no longer control 
the United States government; we will root you out and destroy you.”  Id.  Additionally, 
hate crimes often make victims suppress their beliefs.  Hurd & Moore, supra note 28, at 
1087; McCoy, supra note 28, at 650-52 
33 Uhrich, supra note 21, at 1507 (indicating that the purpose of hate crime legislation is 
to “send the message that the victim, and those similarly situated, are valued by society 
and that society will defend victims of violent crimes”). 
34 Gellman, supra note 28, at 340; McCoy, supra note 28, at 652. 
35 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 20, at 24-25.  Scholars have divided hate crime 
offenders into categories based on their motive, such as thrill and reactive, and have sought 
to expand the typology to include retaliation.  Boeckmann & Turpin-Petrosino, supra note 
22, at 216.  Specifically, hate crimes motivated by retaliation “stem from a primary concern 
with reciprocating or paying back for a prior hate crime incident.  This category is 
particularly relevant to identifying and prosecuting hate crime criminals from areas in 
which intergroup relations are strained and tensions are high.”  Id.  As to revenge as a goal, 
see State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558, 564 (Or. 1992); Jack McDevitt, Jack Levin & Susan 
Bennett, Hate Crime Offenders: An Expanded Typology, 58 J. SOC. ISSUES 303 (2002); supra note 
29 and accompanying text (discussing Plowman and why hate crimes are worse than crimes 
without a bias motivation). 
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interferes with the stability and safety of the community.36  In particular, 
a community may fear victimization after an offender discovers the 
community’s sympathetic attitude towards victims.37   
Furthermore, the surrounding community suffers increased 
psychological trauma similar to that suffered by victims.38  The 
community experiences feelings such as sympathy, empathy, insecurity, 
isolation, and depression.39  Penalty enhancements are retributive and 
address this harm because they convey society’s disapproval of hate 
crime.40  Federal and state legislatures have recognized these effects of 
hate crime on victims and society and have enacted and strengthened 
hate crime legislation in response.41 
3. Hate Crime Legislation 
Within the past twenty years, federal and state legislatures have 
recognized the need to punish and deter hate crime offenders.42  
                                                 
36 Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2005, H.R. 259, 109th Cong. (2005).  Hate crime 
produces two types of victims, direct and indirect.  Gellman, supra note 28, at 342.  The 
latter victims may, but do not necessarily, possess the targeted characteristic.  Id.  For 
instance, an attack on a Catholic instills a fear of future attacks in other Catholics as well as 
other races and religions within the community.  Id.  Ultimately, “bigotry-related crime 
affects society as a whole, by distancing non-bigoted majority group members from 
disempowered groups.”  Id. 
37 Gellman, supra note 28, at 342; Jasket, supra note 27, at 540-41.  For instance, an assault 
on a minority instills fear in other minorities despite the message that the offender 
intended to convey.  Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 20, at 25.  Consequently, 
minorities consciously avoid vulnerable situations such as refraining from moving into a 
neighborhood dominated by a majority.  Id. 
38 Hurd & Moore, supra note 28, at 1090. 
39 Id.  Hurd and Moore question the legitimacy of this argument for enhanced sentences 
based on the effects that hate crimes have on the community.  Id. at 1091.  The primary 
objection is whether or not the community suffers more harm from a hate crime than a 
crime motivated without a bias.  Id.; see supra note 36 (providing the behavioral changes 
that hate crimes cause members of the community). 
40 Eric J. Grannis, Note, Fighting Words and Fighting Freestyle: The Constitutionality of 
Penalty Enhancement for Bias Crimes, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 178, 222 (1993). 
41 Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2005, H.R. 259, 109th Cong. (2005); Gellman, supra note 
28, at 340; McCoy, supra note 28, at 655.  Congressional findings indicate that existing 
federal laws are inadequate to address the problems caused by hate crime.  Hate Crimes 
Prevention Act of 2005, H.R. 259, § 2; see infra note 49 and accompanying text (presenting 
current federal bills introduced in the House and Senate that seek to ensure prosecution of 
hate crimes and provide federal assistance to local governments enforcement of hate crime 
laws); infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text (providing different hate crime state 
statutes). 
42 See Spillane, supra note 19, at 21 (noting that prior to 1980, five states enacted a statute 
punishing hate crime and by 1995 more than a majority of states had legislation punishing 
the heinous acts). 
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Specifically, Congress responded to this need by enacting the Hate 
Crime Statistics Act in 1990.43  This Act requires the Attorney General to 
obtain data and create guidelines regarding crime that resulted from 
intolerance for a particular religion or characteristic.44  The Act also 
provides some punishment for committing a hate crime.45   
Congress also enacted the Hate Crime Prevention Act, which 
criminalized hate crime and originated from 1969 congressional civil 
rights legislation.46  The statute provides a one year sentence for any 
offender who intimidates or injures another based on a specific 
characteristic or religion while the victim seeks employment, enjoys a 
benefit, or enrolls in a public institution.47  The government must 
demonstrate that the crime was committed while the victim was engaged 
in a federally protected activity.48  Currently, four bills before the House 
                                                 
43 Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-275, § (b)(1), 104 Stat. 140 (1990). 
44 Id.  The requirement of collecting data took place from 1990-1994.  Id.  However, the 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 was the Act that broadened the 
characteristics to include disability.  Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).  The Act was codified as amended in 
numerous titles of the United States Code.  Id.  Throughout the years that the FBI gathered 
and reported statistics, the number of hate crime increased, although the data collected 
included reports from a greater number of police departments.  Id.  Statistics from “almost 
2,800 police departments in 32 states” in 1991 indicated that 4,558 hate crimes were 
committed that year.  ADL.org, Hate Crimes Laws, http://www.adl.org/99hatecrime/ 
federal.asp (last visited Jan. 31, 2007) [hereinafter ALD.org].  In 1992, the FBI reported 7,442 
hate crimes from 6,181 agencies and from “42 states and the District of Columbia.”  Id.  
Data from 1994 indicated there were 7,587 hate crimes from 7,356 police departments.  Id.  
There were 7,947 hate crimes reported in 1995 from 9,584 agencies in the United States.  Id.  
Finally, in 1996 the FBI reported 8,759 hate crimes from 11,355 law enforcement agencies 
throughout the nation.  Id.  Two years later, the number of hate crimes reported decreased 
to 7,755.  UFBI, http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel99/ucr98.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 
2007).  Before the turn of the century, 12,122 agencies reported 7,876 hate crimes.  Id.  
Throughout 2000, agencies reported 8,152 hate crimes.  Id.  In 2001, data reported by 11,987 
law enforcement agencies indicated that 9,276 hate crimes were committed.  Id.  Data from 
2002 indicated that 1,868 out of 12,073 agencies reported 7,462 hate crime incident reports.  
Id.  However in 2003, 1,967 out of 11,909 agencies reported 7,489 hate crimes.  Id.  States 
such as Hawaii have similar statutes that require the gathering and reporting of hate crime 
data on national origin, gender identity or expression in addition to those required in the 
federal reporting guidelines that expanded to include disability.  See HAW. REV. STAT. 
§§ 846-51 to 54 (2004) (hate crime reporting). 
45 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text; infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text 
(providing federal hate crime legislation). 
46 Federally Protected Activities, 18 U.S.C § 245 (2000); Jasket, supra note 27, at 519. 
47 18 U.S.C. § 245. 
48 Id.; ADL.org, supra note 44.  The statute defines a federally protected activity as 
(A) enrolling in or attending any public school or public college; (B) 
participating in or enjoying any benefit, service, privilege, program, 
facility or activity provided or administered by any State or 
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of Representatives and Senate propose amendments to existing federal 
hate crime legislation.49  But in addition to federal hate crime legislation, 
                                                                                                             
subdivision thereof; (C) applying for or enjoying employment, or any 
perquisite thereof, by any private employer or any agency of any State 
or subdivision thereof, or joining or using the services or advantages of 
any labor organization, hiring hall, or employment agency; (D) 
serving, or attending upon any court of any State in connection with 
possible service, as a grand or petit juror, (E) traveling in or using any 
facility of interstate commerce, or using any vehicle, terminal, or 
facility of any common carrier by motor, rail, water, or air; (F) enjoying 
the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
accommodations of any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which 
provides lodging to transient guests, or of any restaurant, cafeteria, 
lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility which serves 
the public and which is principally engaged in selling food or 
beverages for consumption on the premises, or of any gasoline station, 
or of any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, 
stadium, or any other place of exhibition or entertainment which 
serves the public, or of any other establishment which serves the 
public and (i) which is located within the premises of any of the 
aforesaid establishments or within the premises of which is physically 
located any of the aforesaid establishments, and (ii) which holds itself 
out as serving patrons of such establishments. 
18 U.S.C. § 245.  See United States v. Johns, 615 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1980) (chapter of the Ku 
Klux Klan was convicted for intimidating and interfering with members of the NAACP’s 
efforts to secure better employment by firing shots at the homes and cars of NAACP 
members); United States v. Griffin, 525 F.2d 710, 712 (1st Cir. 1975) (the defendant was 
convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 245(b) for purposely interfering with black children’s right to 
attend school without knowing the extent of that right); United States  v. Price, 464 F.2d 
1217 (8th Cir. 1972) (demonstrating a federally protected activity).  But see United States v. 
DeLaurentis, 491 F.2d 208, 209 (2d Cir. 1974) (where one defendant was charged with a 
violation of § 245(b) for interfering with members of a labor unions’ right not to participate 
in a concerted labor activity; however, the charge was dismissed because the jury 
disagreed). 
49 Thomas.loc.gov, Thomas Legislative Information on the Internet, http://thomas.loc.gov/ 
cgi-bin/query/bdquery (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).  First, the House proposed the Hate 
Crimes Prevention Act of 2005 “[t]o enhance Federal enforcement of hate crimes.”  Hate 
Crimes Prevention Act of 2005, H.R. 259, 109th Cong. (2005).  This bill provides an 
amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 245 to imprison, fine, or both imprison and fine anyone who 
willfully injures another with a firearm because of the victim’s “actual or perceived race, 
color, religion, or national origin.”  Id.  The bill further provides the same punishment for 
anyone who injures another based on the victim’s perceived “religion, gender, sexual 
orientation, or disability.”  Id.  One stipulation is that the circumstances must include the 
offender or victim’s participation in foreign or interstate commerce, otherwise the offender 
may not be prosecuted under the proposed amendment to the statute.  Id.  Also, it 
proposed a bill to provide federal assistance to state and local governments to further the 
enforcement of hate crime laws.  Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 
2005, H.R. 2662, 109th Cong. (2005).  The bill proposes to provide state and local 
governments with additional personnel for the enforcement of hate crime laws.  Id. § 6.  
The bill further seeks to offer “technical, forensic, prosecutorial, or any other form of 
assistance in the criminal investigation or prosecution” of hate crime.  Id. § 4(a)(1).  
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states have responded by enacting statutes that punish hate crime 
offenders.50  State legislation has generally regulated either hate speech 
or hate crime.51  Since speech-based hate statutes punish an individual 
for offensive statements directed at another because of a particular 
characteristic or religion, they have been struck down by the Supreme 
Court because they are inconsistent with freedom of speech.52  In R.A.V. 
v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota,53 the Supreme Court found that Minnesota’s 
speech-based hate statute violated the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and declared it unconstitutional.54  Specifically, 
                                                                                                             
Proposed in the House, the Hate Crime Statistics Improvement Act of 2005, H.R. 1193, 
109th Cong. (2005), broadens the necessary reporting characteristic-based crimes to include 
gender.  Currently, the Hate Crime Statistics Act only includes race, religion, sexual 
orientation, and ethnicity.  Id.  Finally, the Senate introduced the Local Law Enforcement 
Enhancement Act of 2005, S. 1145, 109th Cong. (2005), which expands the duties of the 
federal sentencing commission.  The bill includes amendments similar to the House bill 
and the Hate Crime Statistics Improvement Act of 2005, H.R. 1193.  Id.  However, the 
Senate bill added to the sentencing commission’s current duty of enhancing the penalty for 
an adult who recruits a juvenile to commit a crime.  Id.  The amendment requires the 
Commission to investigate (without providing the exact method) the frequency of adults 
who recruit juveniles to commit hate crime.  Id. § 8.  Further, the bill obligates the 
Commission to enhance the penalty for an adult who enlisted a juvenile to commit a hate 
crime.  Id. 
50 See infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (providing a further description of state 
hate crime legislation). 
51 Anthony S. Winer, Hate Crimes, Homosexuals, and the Constitution, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 387, 419 (1994); see Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the 
Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2338 (1989) (discussing hate speech and the effect of 
hate speech on the victim). 
52 Winer, supra note 51, at 419; see Boeckmann & Turpin-Petrosino, supra note 22, at 209 
(defining hate speech as “speech that (1) has a message of racial inferiority, (2) is directed 
against a member of a historically oppressed group, and (3) is persecutory, hateful, and 
degrading”); infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (striking a hate based speech statute). 
53 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
54 Id.  In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the petitioner, a juvenile, along with a couple of 
teenagers, assembled a cross out of broken chair legs and burned it in the yard of a 
neighboring black family.  Id. at 380.  The individuals were charged under St. Paul’s Bias-
Motivated Crime Ordinance, which provided: 
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, 
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a 
burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable 
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the 
basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly 
conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
Id.  The petitioner brought a challenge against the statute alleging that the statute was 
overbroad and violated the First Amendment because it was content based and facially 
invalid.  Id.  The Court held the statute unconstitutional because it was overbroad and 
regulated areas of protected speech.  Id. at 391.  The Court reasoned that the ordinance 
“prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech 
addresses.”  Id. at 381.  The ordinance was content based and was not within any First 
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speech-based hate statutes invariably conflict with the First Amendment 
because the statutes regulate protected speech.55  In contrast, hate crime 
statutes are more likely to withstand constitutional challenges because 
the statutes regulate conduct instead of speech.56   
In fact, almost every state has a hate crime statute that either 
provides a criminal penalty or a penalty enhancement for the 
commission of a hate crime.57  The breadth of hate crime statutes vary 
among states, but most state statutes generally fit into one of three 
different categories.58  First, some statutes may provide a sentence 
                                                                                                             
Amendment exception that allowed regulation of speech.  Id. at 394.  The ordinance was 
not a justifiable content-based fighting words statute because the ordinance prohibited 
words “that communicate messages of racial, gender, or religious intolerance” instead of 
an “intolerable . . . mode of expressing whatever idea the speaker wishes to convey.”  Id. at 
393.  Further, the ordinance was not aimed at the secondary effects, which justify content-
based regulation of speech.  Id. at 394.  Finally, the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to 
achieve a compelling governmental interest of protecting members of a group that 
historically faced discrimination because there was a less restrictive alternative.  Id. at 395. 
55 Winer, supra note 51, at 419.  Alternatively, the statute would likely be upheld if it 
regulated obscenity, defamation, or commercial speech, areas of speech unprotected or less 
protected under the First Amendment.  Id. 
56 See State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558 (Or. 1992).  In Plowman, Plowman and three others, 
beat one individual and punched another who fell to the ground at a store in Portland.  Id. 
at 560.  After being informed that the store clerk called the police, Plowman shouted 
“‘[t]hey’re just Mexicans’ and ‘[t]hey’re just . . . wetbacks.’”  Id.  Subsequently, Plowman 
and the other offenders were charged with first degree assault and assault in the fourth 
degree under Oregon’s hate crime statute.  Id.  The statute was challenged under two 
sections of the Oregon Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.  Id.  
The Oregon statute provided a criminal punishment when two or more persons acted in 
concert to “[i]ntentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause physical injury to another 
because of their perception of that person’s race, color, religion, national origin or sexual 
orientation.”  Id.; OR. REV. STAT. § 166.165(1)(a)(A) (2003).  Plowman argued that the phrase 
involving race, religion, national origin or sexual orientation was “void for vagueness.”  
Plowman, 838 U.S. at 562.  The Court upheld the statute because the language was clear and 
it indicated what conduct was prohibited.  Id.  The Court further noted that the statute 
“proscribes and punishes committing an act, not holding a belief” or punishes speech 
because one can commit an assault without speaking.  Id. at 563; see also Roberts v. U.S. 
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (stating that “violence or other types of potentially 
expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their communicative 
impact . . . are entitled to no constitutional protection”); Winer, supra note 51, at 419. 
57 See infra note 61 (providing the states that have a penalty enhancement statute); infra 
note 62 (indicating which states define hate crime as a new crime); infra note 63 (presenting 
the states that have a civil rights statute).  The states that do not have a statute that 
penalizes hate crimes are Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
and South Carolina. 
58 Winer, supra note 51, at 419.  Race, religion and ethnicity are included in most state 
statutes.  Shirley S. Abrahamson et al., Words and Sentences: Penalty Enhancement for Hate 
Crimes, 16 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 515, 522 (1994); ADL.org, supra note 44.  However, 
less consistency exists among states regarding the inclusion of gender, sexual orientation, 
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enhancement for a crime motivated by a bias.59  Many of these statutes 
resemble the Anti-Defamation League’s model penalty enhancement 
statute for bias-motivated crime, which increases the sentence for an 
already defined crime.60  A second type of statutes define hate crime as a 
                                                                                                             
age, and or disability in the corresponding hate crime statute.  ADL.org, supra note 44.  
However, under any hate crime statute, the prosecution has the difficult burden to prove a 
bias motivation.  Spillane, supra note 19, at 24-25.  Elements such as common sense, the 
suspect’s language, including racial slurs, “[s]everity of the attack (particular types of 
mutilation), [l]ack of provocation, [c]ontact or prior history between the victim and suspect, 
[p]revious history of similar incidents in the same area, [and] [a]bsence of any other 
apparent motive (e.g., battery without robbery)” aid the prosecution in fulfilling its burden.  
Id. at 24. 
59 See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-13(a)(3)(b) (2005) (crimes motivated by victim’s race, color, 
religion, national origin, ethnicity, or physical or mental disability); ALASKA STAT. 
§ 12.55.155(C)(22) (2005) (factors in aggravation and mitigation); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-
702(C)(15) (LexisNexis 2005) (sentencing; definition); CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.75 (West 2005) 
(enhanced penalties for hate crime); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-40a (2005) (persistent offenders 
of crimes involving bigotry or bias); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(v) (2005) 
(classification of offenses; sentences); FLA. STAT. § 775.085 (2005) (evidencing prejudice 
while committing offense; reclassification); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-17 (2005), invalidated by 
Botts v. State, 604 S.E.2d 512 (Ga. 2004) (enhanced sentence where defendant intentionally 
selected victim or property as object of offense because of bias or prejudice); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 21-4716 (2004), invalidated by State v. Gould, 23 P.3d 801 (Kan. 2001) (mitigating and 
aggravating factors); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-306 (West 2005) (penalty); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 99-19-305 (2005) (enhanced penalty sentencing procedure); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 45-5-222 (2005) (sentence enhancement); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-111 (2005) (enhanced 
penalty); NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.185 (2004) (additional penalty); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6 
(2005) (extended term of imprisonment); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18B-3 (West 2005) (hate 
crimes); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.10 (McKinney 2005) (sentencing); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-3 
(2005) (felonies and misdemeanors); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.12 (West 2005) (ethnic 
intimidation); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-38 (2004) (hate crimes sentencing act); TENN. CODE. 
ANN. § 40-35-114(22) (2005) (enhancement factors); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.014 
(Vernon 2005) (requiring attendance in an educational program to further tolerance and 
acceptance of others); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.3 (2005) (penalty for hate crime); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1455 (2005) (hate-motivated crimes); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57 (2005) 
(assault and battery); WIS. STAT. § 939.645 (2005) (penalty). 
60 ADL.org, supra note 44.  The ADL’s penalty enhancement model statute for bias 
motivated crimes provides: 
A person commits a Bias-Motivated Crime if, by reason of the actual or 
perceived race, color, religion, national origin, sexual orientation or 
gender of another individual or group of individuals, he violates 
Section ____ of the Penal Code (insert code provisions for criminal 
trespass, criminal mischief, harassment, menacing, intimidation, 
assault, battery and or other appropriate statutorily proscribed 
criminal conduct). 
A Bias-Motivated Crime under this code provision is a ____ 
misdemeanor/felony (the degree of criminal liability should be at least 
one degree more serious than that imposed for commission of the 
underlying offense). 
Hate Crimes Laws, http://www.adl.org/99hatecrime/text_legis.asp (last visited Jan. 31, 
2007).  But see Gellman, supra note 28, at 355-58 (providing the evolution of the ADL model 
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new crime.61  These statutes are independent and specifically prohibit 
crime motivated by a person’s bias.62  A third type of hate crime statutes 
are civil rights statutes that provide a penalty for the interference of a 
victim’s enjoyment of constitutionally protected rights.63  Civil rights 
                                                                                                             
statute and argues that the statute is vague for numerous reasons including a lack of a 
culpable mental state). 
61 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.55 (West 2005) (hate crime defined); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-
9-121 (2005) (bias-motivated crimes); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-181j (2005) (intimidation 
based on bigotry or bias in the first degree); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7902 (2005) (malicious 
harassment defined); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.1 (2005) (hate crime); IND. CODE. ANN. 
§ 10-13-3-1 (West 2005) (bias crime defined); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.031 (West 2005) 
(findings on hate crime); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107:2 (2005) (hate crimes); MD. CODE ANN., 
CRIM. LAW § 10-301 (West 2005) (hate crimes); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 39 (2005) (assault 
or battery for purposes of intimidation); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.147b (2005) (ethnic 
intimidation); MINN. STAT. § 609.2231(4) (2005) (assault in the fourth degree); MO. REV. 
STAT. § 557.035 (2005) (crimes motivated by race, color, religion, national origin, sex, sexual 
orientation or disability of the victim); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-221 (2005) (malicious 
intimidation or harassment relating to civil or human rights); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-401.14 
(2005) (ethnic intimidation); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-14-04 (2005) (official oppression; 
elections; civil rights); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 850 (2005) (malicious intimidation or 
harassment because of race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin or disability); OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 166.155, 165 (West 2003) (intimidation in the second degree); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 22-19B-1 (2005) (actions constituting harassment); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.080 
(2005) (malicious harassment); see also Winer, supra note 51, at 424 (providing new crime 
statutes). 
62 Spillane, supra note 19, at 20 (noting that this category of hate crime legislation 
conflicts the most with the First Amendment because the prosecution includes issues 
related to protected speech).  For instance, Connecticut’s statute defines intimidation based 
on bigotry or bias as: 
(a) A person is guilty of intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the 
first degree when such person maliciously, and with specific intent to 
intimidate or harass another person because of the actual or perceived 
race, religion, ethnicity or sexual orientation of such other person, 
causes serious physical injury to such other person or to a third person.  
(b) Intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the first degree is a class C 
felony. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-181j (2005).  In Connecticut, a Class C felony is punishable for up to 
ten years.  Id. § 53a-35.  Other crimes punishable as a Class C felony punishable for up to 
ten years include bribery of a juror and bribery received by a juror.  Id. § 53a-181j.  
Specifically, for illustration purposes, Connecticut punishes a person for bribing a juror if 
that person “offers, confers or agrees to confer upon a juror any benefit as consideration for 
the juror’s decision or vote.”  Id. § 53a-152.  Therefore, bribery and hate crime are both 
punishable for up to ten years in Connecticut.  Id. 
63 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6 (West 2005) (interference with exercise of civil rights 
because actual or perceived characteristics of victim); IOWA CODE § 729.5 (2005) (violation of 
individual rights); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4003 (2004) (crimes involving personal rights); ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2931 (2005) (interference with constitutional and civil rights is 
prohibited); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 37 (2005) (violations of constitutional rights); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.147b (civil action for ethnic intimidation); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
17-309 (2005) (exercise of civil rights and intimidation); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.3 (2005) 
(penalty for hate crime, civil rights violation); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-6-21 (West 2005) 
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statutes protect the right to engage in certain activities instead of 
punishing offenders because the motivation for the crime was based on a 
particular characteristic.64  Among penalty enhancement statutes, new 
crime laws, and civil rights statutes, penalty enhancement statutes are 
the only statutes that increase hate crime offenders’ punishment solely 
because hate crime is more severe than ordinary violent crime.65   
B. Penalty Enhancement   
Some states recognize the inherent severity of hate crime, like 
Hannah’s and James’s, and provide an increased sentence beyond that of 
the underlying crime if a jury determines beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the crime was committed because of a bias motivation.66 
                                                                                                             
(prohibiting violations of an individual’s civil rights); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-9-102 (2005) 
(discrimination prohibited; penalties); Winer, supra note 51, at 387.  Some civil rights 
statutes provide a civil cause of action regardless of the outcome of the criminal trial.  Mich. 
Comp. Laws § 750.147b (2005).  Specifically, Michigan allows recovery in the amount of 
$2,000 or three times the amount of damages, whichever is greater.  Id. 
64 For example, Tennessee’s statute provides, “. . . it is the right of every person 
regardless of race, color, ancestry, religion or national origin, to be secure and protected 
from fear, intimidation, harassment and bodily injury caused by the activities of groups 
and individuals.”  TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-309 (2005).  Section (b) defines the offense of 
intimidating others from exercising civil rights if one: 
(1) Injures or threatens to injure or coerces another person with the 
intent to unlawfully intimidate another from the free exercise or 
enjoyment of any right or privilege secured by the constitution or laws 
of the state of Tennessee; (2) Injures or threatens to injure or coerces 
another person with the intent to unlawfully intimidate another 
because that other exercised any right or privilege secured by the 
constitution or laws of the United States or the constitution or laws of 
the state of Tennessee; (3) Damages, destroys or defaces any real or 
personal property of another person with the intent to unlawfully 
intimidate another from the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or 
privilege secured by the constitution or laws of the state of Tennessee; 
or (4) Damages, destroys or defaces any real or personal property of 
another person with the intent to unlawfully intimidate another 
because that other exercised any right or privilege secured by the 
constitution or laws of the United States or the constitution or laws of 
the state of Tennessee. 
Id.  Further the statute indicates that a violation of this section is a class D felony.  Id.  
Tennessee law provides that a class D felony is punishable for not less than two and no 
more than twelve years in prison.  Id. § 40-35-111.  Many of the state civil rights statutes 
that contain such a penalty resemble the language of the Federal Hate Crimes Prevention 
Act. 
65 Spillane, supra note 19, at 20. 
66 See supra note 59 and accompanying text (identifying the states that provide an 
enhanced penalty for a hate crime). 
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1. Application of an Enhanced Penalty Statute 
If a state has adopted a penalty enhancement statute for hate crime, 
offenders will be subject to an increased punishment.67  The purpose of 
an enhanced penalty is not to punish the act, or the offender’s intention, 
but the hatred that motivated the offender to create and act on the 
intention.68  As a result, to implement the increased punishment for hate 
crime, the prosecution must not only prove the elements of the 
underlying offense, such as battery,69 but must also prove a bias or 
motivation of hate.70  For example, a sentence enhancement may 
                                                 
67 Id.; see Dobbins v. State, 605 So. 2d 922, 923 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).  The court stated 
that indicators such as the relationship between the offender and victim, as well as the 
conversation during the offense, demonstrate the selection of a victim based on a particular 
characteristic and will support an increased sentence.  Id.  However, if a fight arose over a 
dispute for a woman or money, derogatory comments regarding race or religion would be 
insufficient to support an enhanced penalty.  Id.  Notably, mistake is not a possible escape 
to an enhanced penalty.  HATE CRIME DATA, supra note 19, at 6.  Specifically, if an offender 
mischaracterizes the victim’s sexuality, race, religion or the like, the misperception does not 
affect classifying the crime as a hate crime.  Id.  Illustrative of this point is a situation where 
a heterosexual patronized a gay bar and was attacked by teenagers under the 
misperception that the heterosexual was gay.  Id.  However, the teenagers will still be 
subject to the relevant hate crime or penalty enhancement statutes because the offense was 
motivated by an anti-gay sentiment.  Id. 
68 Hurd & Moore, supra note 28, at 1128-29. 
69 Gregory R. Nearpass, Comment, The Overlooked Constitutional Objection and Practical 
Concerns to Penalty-Enhancement Provisions of Hate Crime Legislation, 66 ALB. L. REV. 547, 563-
64 (2003); see Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20 (1992); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990); 
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (providing an example of the application of a 
sentence enhancement for other purposes, including recidivists); see also ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 5-4-501 (West 2005) (habitual offender statute); Baxter v. State, 922 S.W.2d 682 (Ark. 1996) 
(the habitual offender statute provides a sentence enhancement following conviction if one 
was previously convicted of a felony). 
70 Nearpass, supra note 69, at 563-64.  Also applicable to determining a bias for a 
conviction under an ordinary hate crime law, the Hate Crime Data provides a list that is 
not exhaustive, of fourteen possible pieces of objective evidence to indicate if a crime was 
motivated by bias.  HATE CRIME DATA, supra note 19, at 4.  The evidence includes: 
1.  The offender and the victim were of different race, religion, 
disability, sexual orientation, and/or ethnicity/national origin.  For 
example, the victim was black and the offender was white.  2.  Bias-
related oral comments, written statements, or gestures were made by 
the offender which indicate his/her bias.  For example, the offender 
shouted a racial epithet at the victim.  3.  Bias-related drawings, 
markings, symbols, or graffiti were left at the crime scene.  For 
example, a swastika was painted on the door of a synagogue.  8.  A 
substantial portion of the community where the crime occurred 
perceived that the incident was motivated by bias.  10.  The incident 
coincided with a holiday or a date of particular significance relating to 
a race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity/national 
origin, e.g., Martin Luther King Day, Rosh Hashanah. 
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upgrade the classification of an offense from a second degree offense to a 
first degree offense or a Class C felony to a Class B felony.71  
Alternatively, some states increase the duration of a sentence by one to 
three years.72  The failure of judicial challenges to enhanced penalty hate 
crime statutes demonstrate the courts’ general acceptance of increased 
punishments for hate crime offenders.73 
2. Constitutional Challenges to Penalty Enhancement Statutes 
Hate crime penalty enhancement statutes have been challenged on 
numerous constitutional grounds.74  First the statutes do not violate the 
First Amendment; the Supreme Court has ruled that such laws are 
content neutral and do not regulate protected speech.75  Equal Protection 
                                                                                                             
Id. at 5. 
71 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (1994). 
72 Two main provisions of California’s penalty enhancement for hate crime state: 
(a) Except in the case of a person punished under Section 422.7, a 
person who commits a felony that is a hate crime or attempts to 
commit a felony that is a hate crime, shall receive an additional term of 
one, two, or three years in the state prison, at the court’s discretion.  (b) 
Except in the case of a person punished under Section 422.7, or 
subdivision (a)  * * * of this section, any person who commits a felony 
that is a hate crime, or attempts to commit a felony that is a hate crime, 
and who voluntarily acted in concert with another person, either 
personally or by aiding and abetting another person, shall receive an 
additional two, three, or four years in the state prison, at the court’s 
discretion. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.75 (West Supp. 2005); see supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text 
(describing the different forms of hate crime legislation and providing the corresponding 
state statutes, including penalty enhancement statutes). 
73 McCoy, supra note 28, at 654; see Lu-in Wang, The Transforming Power of “Hate”: Social 
Cognition Theory and the Harms of Bias-Related Crime, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 80 (1997); Terry A. 
Maroney, Note, The Struggle Against Hate Crime: Movement at a Crossroads, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
564, 568 (1998) (arguing that the surge of legislation, police activity, judicial reaction, and 
scholarly interest, reflects society’s disapproval of hate crime). 
74 See infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text (providing cases that involve challenges 
based on the First Amendment, Equal Protection, Due Process, vagueness, and 
overbreadth). 
75 Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 484; Grannis, supra note 40, at 213.  Penalty enhancement statutes 
are content neutral because the statutes are viewpoint and subject-matter neutral.  ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1058 (Aspen Pub. 2005).  For example, the statutes do 
not prohibit anti-abortion demonstrations and permit pro-abortion demonstrations.  Id.  If 
the statutes regulated speech, the regulation would be permissible only if the statute 
regulated areas of unprotected and less protected speech, such as obscenity, fighting 
words, incitement of illegal activity, and commercial speech.  Id. at 1150.  Specifically, in 
Mitchell, the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to Wisconsin’s penalty 
enhancement provision.  508 U.S. at 484.  Mitchell argued that the statute violated the First 
Amendment because it punished “offenders’ bigoted beliefs” through enhancing the 
penalty because of a discriminatory motive.  Id. at 485  However, the Court upheld the 
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challenges are unsuccessful because penalty enhancement statutes do 
not seek to protect a certain class.76  Alternatively, the statutes do not 
violate procedural due process if the jury makes the determination 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was motivated because of a 
bias—a legitimate reason for enhancing an offender’s penalty.77  
Enhanced penalty statutes may also be challenged as unconstitutionally 
vague, such as where they fail to define subject activity, are 
unconstitutionally broad, or where they encompass constitutionally 
protected activities.78  Unsuccessful challenges to enhanced penalty 
                                                                                                             
statute against the challenge because the Constitution does not preclude the sentencing 
judge from considering motives or beliefs in determining a punishment.  Id. at 486; see 
George L. Blum, Annotation, Validity, Construction and Effect of “Hate Crimes” Statutes, 
“Ethnic Intimidation” Statutes, or the Like, 22 A.L.R. 5TH § 61, at 261 (2005) (providing 
additional cases involving challenges to penalty enhancement statutes based on the First 
Amendment). 
76 The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that all persons similarly situated should be 
treated alike.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 5 (8th ed. 2004).  Further, discriminatory 
legislation must survive rational basis scrutiny unless the statute discriminates against a 
protected class which subjects the law to a higher level of scrutiny, intermediate or strict.  
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 75, at 618; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra, at 577.  In State v. 
Ladue, the defendant argued that the respective state’s hate motivated crime penalty 
enhancement statutes provided special protection for certain classes of victims based on 
race, sex, or national origin.  631 A.2d. 236, 237 (Vt. 1993). However, the court disagreed 
and stated that the statute does not treat similarly situated victims differently.  Id.  Instead 
the statute provides the same protection as if they were targeted because of a certain 
characteristic.  Id.  In State v. Mortimer, the court accepted the government’s legitimate 
interest in increasing the punishment for hate motivated crimes to “prevent the conduct 
from occurring at all.”  641 A.2d 257, 267 (N.J. 1994).  Therefore, the statute was upheld 
against the Equal Protection challenge.  Id.; see Blum, supra note 75, § 5 (discussing 
challenges to penalty enhancement statutes based on Equal Protection). 
77 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 472 (2000).  In Apprendi, the trial judge 
applied the enhanced penalty statute to Apprendi’s punishment after the determination by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the crime was motivated by a racial bias.  Id. at 470.  
Subsequently, Apprendi challenged New Jersey’s hate crime penalty enhancement statute 
and argued that it violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.  Id.  Notably, the 
challenge was not based on the substance of the statute, but the procedures required to 
determine an enhanced penalty.  Id. at 472.  The statute allowed the judge to determine bias 
motivation and subject a defendant to an enhanced penalty.  Id.  The Supreme Court relied 
on the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and the “jury trial guarantees of the 
Sixth Amendment” to determine that “any fact . . . that increases the maximum penalty for 
a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 476.  Subsequently, the Court’s decision required that a jury, not a 
judge, determine bias beyond a reasonable doubt to subject a defendant to an enhanced 
penalty for a hate motivated crime.  Id.  Therefore, New Jersey’s hate crime enhancement 
procedure was “an unacceptable departure from the jury tradition that is an indispensable 
part of our criminal justice system.”  Id. at 497; see also Blum, supra note 75, § 3 (discussing 
challenges to penalty enhancement statutes based on Due Process). 
78 A vague law precludes a reasonable person from determining what speech is 
permitted and what speech is prohibited.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 75, at 1085.  
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statutes demonstrate the constitutionality of penalty enhancements hate 
crime statutes and the desire to deter both juveniles and adults from 
committing hate crimes through an increased punishment.79   
C. Juvenile Delinquency 
The severity of Hannah’s and James’s hate crimes determines which 
criminal justice system, the juvenile or adult, will process the case.80  Part 
II.C.1 provides a definition of juvenile delinquency.81  Part II.C.2 
examines the jurisdiction of the juvenile system.82  Finally, Part II.C.3 
presents various theories that explain the causes of juvenile delinquency, 
which is necessary in examining possible parental liability.83 
1. Defining “Juvenile Delinquent” 
A “juvenile delinquent” is a minor who displays antisocial behavior 
for which an adult who engaged in the same misconduct would be 
subject to a criminal penalty. 84  The likelihood that juveniles will engage 
                                                                                                             
Alternatively, an overbroad law regulates substantially more speech than the Constitution 
permits.  Id. at 1087; see Richards v. State, 643 So. 2d 89, 90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) 
(upholding the penalty enhancement statute against a vagueness challenge because “the 
statute clearly contains as one of its essential elements that the defendant was bias-
motivated in committing the crime charged in that he or she intentionally selected the 
crime victim because of the victim’s race, color, ethnicity, religion, or national origin”); 
Dobbins v. State, 605 So. 2d 922 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting a vagueness and 
overbreadth challenge to the penalty enhancement statute because the statute did require 
that the racial slurs be related to the commission of a crime); Botts v. State, 604 S.E.2d 512, 
538 (Ga. 2004) (striking Georgia’s hate crime penalty enhancement statute because the 
statute failed to provide offenders with notice of the prohibited conduct); see also Blum, 
supra note 75, at § 4 (discussing challenges to penalty enhancement statutes based on 
vagueness and overbreadth). 
79 See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text (explaining the constitutional challenges 
to penalty enhancement statutes). 
80 See infra note 104 (indicating that juveniles will likely be punished in the adult system 
for more serious crimes such as murder). 
81 See infra Part II.C.1 (defining juvenile delinquency and explaining the origins of 
juveniles’ hatred). 
82 See infra Part II.C.2 (examining the goals of the juvenile system in addition to 
jurisdiction of the juvenile system). 
83 See infra Part II.C.3 (providing theories such as the biological, anomie, cultural 
deviance, and control). 
84 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 884 (8th ed. 2004).  Although reports indicated that the 1999 
rate of 16.2% of arrests for violent crime for individuals under eighteen was low, Congress 
argued that the rates were still too high.  Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 42 
U.S.C. § 5601 (2000).  Additional reports indicate that juvenile crime rates are expected to 
double by 2010, which will result in a dramatic increase.  Tammy Thurman, Parental 
Responsibility Laws/Are They the Answer to Juvenile Delinquency?  5 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 99, 100 
(2003); see James C. Backstrom & Gary L. Walker, The Prosecutor in Juvenile Justice: Advocacy 
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in delinquency increases as parental supervision decreases.85  Research 
indicates that a dysfunctional family and truancy also contribute to 
juvenile delinquency, but economic resources are not determinative of 
the presence or absence of juvenile delinquency.86  Those factors, inter 
alia, help explain why minors participate in deviant behavior, including 
hate crime, of which juveniles are common offenders.87   
Juvenile hate crime is usually a consequence of violence and 
prejudice.88  Juveniles may possess a prejudice against anyone who is of 
a different race, has a dissimilar religious belief, or a different sexual 
preference.89  These prejudices are commonly learned and accepted by 
juveniles from their parents.90  Also, juveniles will likely adopt the same 
prejudice and develop a similar hatred when the juveniles’ peers support 
                                                                                                             
in the Courtroom and Leadership in the Community, PROSECUTOR, May-June 2004, at 37 (noting 
that juvenile crime statistics include juveniles from all backgrounds and the prediction that 
in 2010 juveniles will compose 22% of the population). 
85 Howard Davidson, No Consequences—Re-examining Parental Responsibility Laws, 7 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 24 (1995).  Specifically, delinquents influence minors who are, 
overall, “good kids.”  Id.  Delinquency results from inadequate supervision in a household 
with two working parents.  Id. 
86 Backstrom & Walker, supra note 84, at 44; Earl F. Martin & Marsha Kline Pruett, The 
Juvenile Sex Offender and the Juvenile Justice System, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 279, 296-97 (1998); 
Davidson, supra note 85, at 24.  Statistics from Miami indicate that an overwhelming 71% of 
juveniles charged with a criminal offense had been truant from school.  Janet Stroman, 
Holding Parents Liable for their Children’s Truancy, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 47, 48 
(2000).  Many factors cause juvenile misconduct, however a lack of parental supervision 
contributes to juvenile delinquency and each factor has a different solution.  Davidson, 
supra note 85, at 29.  Other factors that have been linked to juvenile delinquency include 
“poverty, disorganized communities, media violence, [and] drugs.”  Jerry E. Tyler et al., 
Parental Liability Laws:  Rationale, Theory, and Effectiveness, 37 SOC. SCI. J. 1, 14 (2000). 
87 Jacobs & Potter, supra note 23, at 21; see supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text 
(discussing common hate crime offenders); see also Andrew M. Gilbert & Eric D. Marchand, 
Splitting the Atom or Splitting the Hairs—The Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1999, 30 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 931, 974 (noting that juvenile involvement in the commission of hate crime is 
increasing); FBI.gov, Crime in the United States 2002, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_02/ 
html/web/arrested/04-table41.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2007) (providing arrest statistics 
on a variety of crimes committed by persons under 15, 18, 21, and 25 years old). 
88 Steinberg, supra note 24, at 983.  Statistics from 1995-2000 on juvenile hate crime 
indicates that juveniles committed 969 or 16.5% of hate crimes committed within five years.  
An Analysis of NIBRS Hate Crime (1995-2000), http://www.as.wvu.edu/~jnolan/incao.htm 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2007).  Further, this was the highest percentage among four age groups: 
under 18, 18-24, 25-39, and over 40.  Id. 
89 Steinberg, supra note 24, at 983.  Steinberg argues that juvenile hate crime offenders 
carry out “prejudicial beliefs and emotions concerning people who are perceived as 
different.”  Id. 
90 Prejudice, the most commonly racial prejudice, is learned from an older generation.  
Uhrich, supra note 21, at 1497.  Children likely adopt the same prejudices as their parents.  
Id.; see supra note 22 and accompanying text (which provides that prejudices are firmly 
rooted in society and passed down through generations). 
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a particular bias.91  Finally, adults with a bias motivation may recruit 
juveniles to perform illegal conduct such as hate crime.92  Regardless of 
the source, just like adults, if juveniles commit a crime because of a bias, 
they can be convicted of a hate crime or subject to increased penalty for 
an already defined crime.93  Whether the adult or juvenile criminal 
justice system will prosecute juvenile hate crime offenders depends on 
the severity of the hate crime itself.94   
2. Jurisdiction of the Juvenile Justice System 
In response to the increase in juvenile delinquency, federal and state 
legislatures have reacted in different ways.95  Congress has sought to 
expand jurisdiction over juvenile delinquents and prosecute juveniles as 
adults in federal court.96  State legislatures have increased the duration of 
                                                 
91 Steinberg, supra note 24, at 983.  The prejudice is held among a group of juveniles and 
not just one juvenile.  Id.  Particularly, a prejudice held by a group becomes “widely shared 
and enduring element of the culture in which it occurs.”  Id.  Prejudices held among a 
group “pose a particular threat to young people, who are the most impressionable 
members of society.  Violence and prejudice have become unavoidable in schools; rather 
than a refuge from hate attacks, schools have become fertile ground for violent bigotry.”  
Id. 
92 Uhrich, supra note 21, at 1473. The Senate recognized this recent phenomena and 
proposed a bill that provided that the Federal Sentencing Commission shall “amend the 
Federal sentencing guidelines to provide sentencing enhancements . . . for adult defendants 
who recruit juveniles to assist in the commission of hate crimes.”  Local Law Enforcement 
Enhancement Act of 2005, supra note 49, § 8. 
93 See In re Vladimir P., 670 N.E.2d 839, 844 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (convicting a juvenile for 
aggravated assault and a hate crime because evidence indicated beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant threw a knife at a boy by reason of the victim’s religion); ADL.org, supra 
note 44 (discussing a Texas verdict that convicted a juvenile of a hate crime because the 
juvenile and three others burned a cross on the victim’s lawn, hung a noose on a tree, and 
spray painted a racial epithet on the victim’s driveway). 
94 Spillane, supra note 19, at 4; see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 260B.101 (2005); Backstrom & 
Walker, supra note 84, at 40 (presenting the factors that warrant the transfer of a juvenile to 
adult court which include “the seriousness of the crime, the threat to public safety, the age 
of the juvenile, the juvenile’s criminal history and other relevant factors”). 
95 Davidson, supra note 85, at 23; see Juvenile Justice System Structure and Process, 
http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/structure_process/case.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2007) 
[hereinafter Juvenile Justice System] (diagramming how a delinquency case is processed 
within the juvenile system). 
96 Laura K. Langley, Giving Up On Youth: The Danger of Recent Attempts to Federalize 
Juvenile Crime, 25 J. JUV. L. 1 (2005).  The original notion against prosecuting juveniles was 
reversed in the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act.  18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2000).  The Federal 
Juvenile Delinquency Act requires a showing by the Attorney General of one of three 
factors to prosecute a juvenile in federal court that: 
(1) the juvenile court or other appropriate court of a State does not 
have jurisdiction or refuses to assume jurisdiction over said juvenile 
with respect to such alleged act of juvenile delinquency, (2) the State 
does not have available programs and services adequate for the needs 
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penalties and decreased the age at which juveniles may be transferred to 
an adult court.97   
The decision to transfer a juvenile to the adult system also 
determines with whom the juvenile will serve a sentence.  Separate 
courts and facilities to incarcerate juvenile delinquents and adult 
criminals have existed for over a century.98  The first juvenile court was 
established in Illinois pursuant to the state’s Juvenile Court Act of 1899.99  
One original goal of the separate facilities was to prevent subjection of 
juveniles to the abuses and risks within the adult system.100  
Subsequently, juveniles were also granted the same basic due process 
rights that adults are afforded in the criminal system.101  If a juvenile is 
                                                                                                             
of juveniles, or (3) the offense charged is a crime of violence that is a 
felony or an offense described in section 401 of the Controlled 
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 841), or section 1002(a), 1003, 1005, 1009, or 
1010(b)(1), (2), or (3) of the Controlled Substances Import and Export 
Act (21 U.S.C. 952(a), 953, 955, 959, 960(b)(1), (2), (3)), or section 924(b), 
(g), or (h) or (x) of this title, and that there is a substantial Federal 
interest in the case or the offense to warrant the exercise of Federal 
jurisdiction. 
Id.; Langley, supra at 3; see United States v. Male Juvenile, 280 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2002); 
United States v. David H., 29 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Rombom, 421 F. 
Supp. 2d 1295 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (involving decisions of which system to prosecute a 
juvenile). 
97 Langley, supra note 96, at 1. 
98 The juvenile court created the issue of which system to punish juveniles who commit 
crimes.  Kimberly Burke, Notes & Comments, All Grown Up: Juveniles Incarcerated in Adult 
Facilities, 25 J. JUV. L. 69 (2005). 
99 Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899, § 1, Ill. Laws 131 (repealed 1965).  Initially the first 
juvenile court focused on civil matters rather than criminal law.  Tyler et al., supra note 86, 
at 3.  Consequently, the emphasis was protection rather than punishing the child for their 
misconduct.  Id.  Subsequently, all but three states established a juvenile court by 1917, 
which sought to further the focus on civil protection instead of criminal punishment.  Id.; 
see FLA. STAT. § 985.201 (2005).  The statute provides the jurisdiction of a circuit court in the 
proceeding of a delinquency case and additional conditions such as age that would require 
the court to relinquish control over the child.  Id. § 985.201. 
100 Burke, supra note 98, at 70.  Most importantly, the juvenile system prevents nonviolent 
juveniles from being housed in the same facility as violent adult criminals because the lack 
of separation is “self-destructive and self-defeating.”  Id. at 69; see FLA. STAT. § 985.215.  The 
statute explicitly provides that juveniles should not be placed in the same cell as adults and 
any contact should only result from an accident.  Burke, supra note 98, at 70.  A rationale for 
separation and risk of integration is that the rate of juvenile suicide is eight times higher 
among those housed in adult facilities than juvenile centers.  Id. at 72.  Another risk of 
integration is a greater possibility of juveniles being harassed or abused by adult inmates.  
Id. 
101 Tyler et al., supra note 86, at 3; see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).  The decision in Gault 
ensures that juveniles are afforded Constitutional rights when prosecuted in the juvenile 
system.  Gault, 387 U.S. at 13.  Specifically, the court stated that “neither the Fourteenth 
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.”  Id.  Therefore, since 1967, among 
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convicted in an adult court, the juvenile must serve a sentence in an 
adult prison.102  As a result, the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention Act of 1974 created standards to encourage consistency 
among states when placing juveniles in adult prisons.103  Finally, an 
underlying purpose of the juvenile system is rehabilitation and to 
convert juveniles into law abiding citizens through clinical processes.104  
Accordingly, the juvenile system has implemented solutions tailored to 
                                                                                                             
other rights, juveniles are afforded the right to counsel, the right to cross examine and 
confront witnesses, and the privilege against self incrimination.  Tyler et al., supra note 86, 
at 3. 
102 See Juvenile Justice System, supra note 95 (noting that the prosecutor makes the 
ultimate decision to prosecute the juvenile within the criminal or juvenile system).  See 
generally Monya A. Bunch, Note, Juvenile Transfer Proceedings: A Place for Restorative Justice 
Values, 47 HOW. L.J. 909, 910 (2004).  For the more serious crimes, the answer is obvious; 
however, many cases are not so clear cut.  Burke, supra note 98, at 69.  Following a 
conviction in an adult court, juveniles are then automatically transferred to adult prisons.  
Id. at 71.  For example, a female juvenile was indicted by a grand jury for numerous 
robberies and then transferred to an adult detention facility pending trial.  State ex rel. 
Powers v. Schwartz, 355 So. 2d 460 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).  The petitioner argued that the 
judge had a non-discretionary duty to keep her in the Youth Hall because the adult facility 
subjected her to cruel and unusual punishment.  Id. at 461.  However, the court disagreed 
and held that the judge had a duty to keep the indicted juvenile ineligible for bail or 
pretrial release in the adult facility.  Id.; see also State Dep’t of Children & Families v. 
Morrison, 727 So. 2d 404 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (dealing with the transfer of a juvenile to 
adult court); Postell v. State, 383 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).  But see FLA. STAT. 
§ 985.233 (2005).  The statute provides the criteria to determine when to impose juvenile 
sanctions instead of adult sanctions.  Id.  Specifically, the court considers factors such as the 
effect of the crime on the community, the maturity of the juvenile, and the offender’s 
criminal history.  Id. 
103 42 U.S.C. § 5633 (2000); Burke, supra note 98, at 70.  The statute provides that juveniles 
should not be placed in an adult facility unless the juvenile is accused of a nonstatus 
offense and the detention should not exceed six hours for the purpose of “processing or 
release; while awaiting transfer to a juvenile facility; or in which period such juveniles 
make a court appearance.”  42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(13) (2000).  Other guidelines include the 
prohibition of detaining juveniles in an adult facility who are aliens, dependents, or who 
violated a court order.  Id. § 5633(a)(11); see FLA. STAT. § 985.215 (providing Florida’s 
guidelines for the detention of a juvenile following the commission of a crime). 
104 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-16 (noting that “[t]he child was to be ‘treated’ and 
‘rehabilitated’ and the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization, were to 
be ‘clinical’ rather than punitive”).  Further, the juvenile system includes educational 
programs designed to encourage juveniles to become productive members of society 
following release.  Burke, supra note 98, at 72.  However, juveniles who commit serious 
crimes such as murder, may be incapable of rehabilitation and would not benefit from 
educational programs inherent in the juvenile system.  Id. at 74.  Therefore, courts detain 
the juveniles in adult facilities.  Id.  For example, a juvenile was sixteen when he was 
convicted of voluntary manslaughter and conspiracy and was sentenced to two to four 
years in an adult facility.  Commonwealth v. Lucas, 622 A.2d 325, 326 (Pa. 1993).  Burke 
argues that the combination of age and commission of a heinous crime may indicate that 
the juvenile system’s programs would not be effective.  Burke, supra note 98, at 74. 
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respective offenses to address and correct the causes of juvenile 
delinquency. 105   
3. Theories of Juvenile Delinquency 
Scholars have developed various theories regarding causes of 
juvenile delinquency.106  These theories evolved from disciplines such as 
biology, psychology, sociology, and anthropology.107  First, biological 
theorists have reasoned that there is a connection between biological 
processes and delinquency.108  These theorists recommend medicine and 
rehabilitation as resolutions to juvenile delinquency.109  Conversely, the 
anomie theory stresses that juveniles’ simultaneous desires and 
inabilities to conform to the majority result in delinquency.110  The 
underlying presumption of the anomie theory is that juveniles will 
perform any act necessary to obtain the status of the dominant culture.111  
Alternatively, the cultural deviance theory explains that the juvenile is 
part of a subculture accepting of deviant behavior.112 A major 
presumption of this theory is that parental influence is an important 
factor in determining whether juveniles will engage in delinquency.113   
                                                 
105 Burke, supra note 98, at 72; Langley, supra note 96, at 3; see Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas 
Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 143 (1998) (noting that separate facilities existed for 
juveniles and adults because juveniles are more vulnerable and therefore different 
correctional responses needed to be administered).  But see Bunch, supra note 103, at 910 
(suggesting that the goals of the juvenile system have changed and are now more similar to 
the adult system because of a focus on punishment); Scott & Grisso, supra, at 137 (arguing 
that the juvenile system’s initial goal of rehabilitation is diminishing and the next step is to 
abolish the juvenile justice system because its current goals are the same as the adult 
system). 
106 Linda A. Chapin, Out of Control?  The Uses and Abuses of Parental Liability Laws to 
Control Juvenile Delinquency in the United States, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 621, 665 (1997). 
107 Id. 
108 Id.  The biological theory proposes that there is a causal connection between biological 
abnormalities and delinquent behavior.  Thurman, supra note 84, at 102.  Further, the 
biological theory parallels past criminology studies that sought to predict criminal behavior 
based on an individual’s physiology.  Id. 
109 Chapin, supra note 106, at 665. 
110 Id. at 666. 
111 Thurman, supra note 84, at 102.  Juveniles resort to illegitimate means to obtain 
desired results.  Chapin, supra note 114, at 666.  For example, a juvenile who cannot 
purchase a car will steal a car to obtain the success enjoyed by the majority.  Id. 
112 Chapin, supra note 106, at 667. 
113 Juveniles learn deviant behavior through association with a particular subculture.  Id.  
Additionally, “[u]nder some circumstances hate crimes may be viewed as mischievous 
juvenile acts committed by youngsters seeking a thrill or peer approval.”  Boeckmann & 
Turpin-Petrosino, supra note 22, at 208; Clausen, supra note 24, at 19. 
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Another theory, the control theory, proposes that there is a 
correlation between the strength of juveniles’ bonds with society and the 
probability of engaging in delinquency.114  This theory states that 
juvenile delinquency is a result of juveniles’ weak bonds to conventional 
society.115  First, this theory emphasizes minors’ close attachment, or lack 
thereof, to parents, teachers, and peers.116  Effective communication and 
spending time with others help to develop these attachments that impact 
whether or not juveniles will engage in delinquency.117  The second 
element, commitment, proposes that juveniles committed to convention 
are more likely to obey the law.118  Conversely, juveniles less committed 
to convention engage in deviant behavior because they have little to lose 
from antisocial activity.119  The involvement element indicates that 
normal activities, such as attending school or possessing a hobby, reduce 
the time available for delinquency.120  Similarly, studies indicate that 
juveniles with high academic involvement and achievement in reading, 
writing, and arithmetic were less likely to participate in delinquency 
than juveniles that were less successful in school.121  The last element 
relates to juveniles’ beliefs in the rules of the deviant subculture and 
                                                 
114 Chapin, supra note 106, at 667-68.  A major presumption of this theory is that parental 
influence is an important factor to determine whether juveniles will engage in delinquency.  
Id. at 669.  Therefore, the greater the attachment between parents and juveniles, the less 
likely that juveniles will become delinquent.  Id.  See generally Bruce Watt et al., Juvenile 
Recidivism: Criminal Propensity, Social Control and Social Learning Theories, 11 PSYCHIATRY 
PSYCHOL. & L. 141 (2004) (providing information on the control theory). 
115 Chapin, supra note 106, at 667-68; see Robert Richard Lyerly & James K. Skipper, Jr., 
Differential Rates of Rural-Urban Delinquency: A Social Control Approach, 19 CRIMINOLOGY 385 
(1981) (attempting to explain through the social control theory the differing rates of 
juvenile delinquency between urban and rural areas). 
116 Chapin, supra note 106, at 668.  Based on the attachment element, a child is supposed 
to learn “socially acceptable behavior” from their parents.  Michael D. Wiatrowski et al., 
Social Control Theory and Delinquency, 46 AM. SOC. REV. 525 (1981). 
117 Watt et al., supra note 114, at 145. 
118 Chapin, supra note 106, at 668.  This element, commitment, has been said to be related 
to the aspiration of pursuing higher education and if pursued, the juvenile will not likely 
engage in delinquent behavior.  Wiatrowski et al., supra note 116, at 525. 
119 Watt et al., supra note 114, at 145. 
120 Chapin, supra note 106, at 668.  Thus, the prediction is that socially active juveniles are 
less likely to engage in delinquency.  Watt et al., supra note 114, at 145; see Angela J. 
Huebner & Sherry C. Betts, Exploring the Utility of Social Control Theory for Youth 
Development: Issues of Attachment, Involvement, and Gender, 34 YOUTH & SOC’Y 123 (2002). 
121 Watt et al., supra note 114, at 145; see Laurie A. Drapela, Does Dropping Out of High 
School Cause Deviant Behavior: An Analysis of the National Education Longitudinal Study, 26 
DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 47 (2005) (studying the impact that dropping out of school has on the 
probability a juvenile will participate in delinquency). 
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subsequent violation of those rules.122  Deviant subcultures possess 
prejudices for a particular race, religion, gender, or ethnicity, and appeal 
to juveniles because the group’s “ideals provide a kind of external 
superego.”123  The control theory implies that parents’ actions may be a 
contributing cause to juvenile delinquency, and that legislatures have 
enacted parental liability laws to encourage parental supervision and 
reduce juvenile delinquency.124  
D. Parental Liability Laws  
Parental liability provides Hannah’s and James’s victims with 
redress against their parents for the hate crimes they committed as 
juvenile delinquents.125  Part II.D.1 explores various methods for 
imposing liability on parents and Part II.D.2 discusses constitutional 
challenges to parental liability statutes.126  
1. Forms of Parental Liability Legislation 
Primarily, parental liability statutes are a reaction to the increase in 
juvenile delinquency.127  The imposition of liability on parents can be 
                                                 
122 Chapin, supra note 106, at 665; see supra note 26 and accompanying text (providing 
deviant subcultures especially those that participate in hate crimes, such as the Ku Klux 
Klan, the Order, and the White Aryan Resistance). 
123 Steinberg et al., supra note 24, at 984. 
124 Chapin, supra note 106, at 668.  But see Tyler et al., supra note 86, at 6.  Tyler points out 
that the problem with the social control method is that the theory only addresses how to 
reduce juvenile delinquency without providing a solution on how to handle its effects.  Id.  
The theory implies that a way to eliminate juvenile delinquency is to confine juveniles to a 
schedule of school, then immediately lock them in their rooms, force them to attend church 
on Sunday, go straight home, and start the process over.  Id.  Even in an ideal world this 
routine is not desirable.  Id.  Conversely, a high amount of parental control may encourage 
a child to rebel or be uncontrollable.  Id.  Tyler argues that this theory fails to provide an 
explanation for juvenile delinquency and does not address the effects of such repressive 
measures.  Id.  However, parental liability laws are one way to address the problem of 
juvenile delinquency.  See infra notes 197-224 and accompanying text (providing how 
parental liability laws are consistent with the control theory). 
125 Thurman, supra note 84, at 99.  “The law has an important role to play in helping to 
ensure that parents protect their children from violence and in holding parents accountable 
when they have had the ability to control their children’s behavior, but failed to do so.”  
Davidson, supra note 85, at 28. 
126 See infra Part II.D.1 (imposing liability on parents through criminal sanctions or civil 
liability based on theirs such as strict liability, misaction, inaction or negligence); infra Part 
II.D.2 (providing challenges to parental liability laws based on the Due Process and Equal 
Protection clauses of the United States Constitution and respective state constitutions). 
127 Chapin, supra note 106, at 631; Thurman, supra note 84, at 99.  Other countries such as 
Australia and England recognize the increased need to hold parents accountable for the 
misconduct of juveniles and have reacted accordingly.  Tyler et al., supra note 86, at 2.  
Parental liability laws have been described as an impulsive reaction within state 
Pfeiffer: To Enhance or Not to Enhance:  Civil Penalty Enhancements for Par
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
1712 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
explained by legal theories such as strict liability, misaction, inaction, or 
negligence.128  These legal theories provide the basis for the imposition of 
a criminal penalty on parents for juvenile misconduct, an action for civil 
damages, or both.129 
A state may hold parents criminally responsible for the misconduct 
of their children through a “contributing to the delinquency of a minor” 
statute.130  The rationale behind such statutes is that the family is the 
                                                                                                             
legislatures to juveniles increased involvement with weapons, gangs, and violence.  Id. at 4.  
Tyler questions if the laws actually reduce juvenile delinquency, and argues that the initial 
response is in the affirmative.  Id. at 9.  Admittedly, punishing the parents instead of the 
child causes one to wonder if parental liability “serves the community or the child.”  Id.; see 
Naomi R. Cahn, Pragmatic Questions About Parental Liability Statutes, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 399 
(providing further explanation for the purpose of parental liability statutes). 
128 Thurman, supra note 84, at 103.  First, liability is imposed regardless of fault, similar to 
strict liability.  Commonly, parents receive sanctions under truancy or curfew statutes with 
the purpose of encouraging parents’ cooperation with school and community officials to 
eliminate the juvenile’s skipping school or staying out after a designated time.  Id.  Second, 
misaction warrants the imposition of liability.  Id.  Misaction involves parents’ knowing or 
willful actions that contribute to the delinquency of a minor.  Id.  Parental misaction 
includes abuse, rejection, or teaching a juvenile how to commit a crime.  Id.  A final legal 
theory is based on inaction or negligence.  Id.  The statutes impose liability on parents for 
the failure to act and the most relevant statutes are improper supervision or neglect.  Id.  
Under this theory, liability is imposed when a parent “entrusted their child with a 
dangerous instrument or if the parents were aware of their child’s vicious propensities.”  
Eve M. Brank et al., Parental Responsibility Statutes: An Organization and Policy Implications, 7 
J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 3 (2005).  This is the view reflected at common law.  Id. 
129 Thurman, supra note 84, at 99.  One argument is that the imposition of a penalty to 
hold parents accountable for juvenile delinquency is a “quick-fix” reaction to the increase 
in juvenile delinquency because the laws are the only “known” way to control juvenile 
delinquency.  Tyler et al., supra note 86, at 8. 
130 Eunice A. Eichelberger, Annotation, Criminal Responsibility of Parent for Act of Child, 12 
A.L.R. 4TH 673 (1994); see Kathryn J. Parsley, Constitutional Limitations on State Power to Hold 
Parents Criminally Liable for the Delinquent Acts of Their Children, 44 VAND. L. REV. 441 (1991) 
(discussing challenges to criminal liability laws based on the vagueness doctrine and right 
to privacy); ALA. CODE § 12-15-13 (2006) (causing, etc., of delinquency, dependency or need 
of supervision of children); ARIZ REV. STAT. § 13-3613 (LexisNexis 2006) (contributing to 
delinquency and dependency; classification; procedure); CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West 
2007) (contributing to delinquency of persons under 18 years; persuading, luring, or 
transporting minors 12 years of age or younger).  Alternatively, parents can also be held 
liable under an endangering the welfare of a child statute.  Davidson, supra note 85, at 23-
24.  Endangering the welfare of the child involves a situation where the parent knows that 
a child is being abused and fails to protect the child.  Id.  Subsequently, laws allow for a 
criminal punishment and recourse in a juvenile civil court in the form of a child protective 
action.  Id.; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 530.060 (West 2004).  The Kentucky statute provides: 
(1) A parent, guardian or other person legally charged with the care or 
custody of a minor is guilty of endangering the welfare of a minor 
when he fails or refuses to exercise reasonable diligence in the control 
of such child to prevent him from becoming a neglected, dependent or 
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primary influence in the lives of juveniles, and that the family is in the 
best position to encourage youth to become constructive members of 
society.131  In 1903, Colorado was the first state to enact a statute that 
provided a penalty for contributing to the delinquency of a minor.132  
Since then, all fifty states have enacted a similar statute providing a 
felony or misdemeanor for parents of juvenile delinquents.133  Under 
these laws, parents are penalized when a lack of supervision causes 
juvenile delinquency.134  But in contrast to tort liability, under a 
                                                                                                             
delinquent child.  (2) Endangering the welfare of a minor is a Class A 
misdemeanor. 
Id. § 530.060. 
131 Parsley, supra note 130, at 446.  The role of the family is to demonstrate the importance 
of obedience to authority.  Id.  Therefore, supporters argue that juvenile delinquency results 
from an absence of parental control and guidance.  Id. 
132 Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993); Thurman, supra note 84, at 103.  The 
original Colorado law provided that contributing to the delinquency of minors was 
punishable as a misdemeanor with a maximum one year imprisonment and/or a $1,000 
fine.  Brank et al., supra note 128, at 4.  Now, the statute provides that contributing to the 
delinquency of a minor is a class 4 felony which is punishable for two to four years in 
prison and one year of parole.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-701 (2005); id. § 18-1.3-401. 
133 James N. Kourie, Annotation, Mens Rea or Guilty Intent as Necessary Element of Offense 
of Contributing to Delinquency or Dependency of  Minor, 31 A.L.R. 3D 848 (2004); see Brank et 
al., supra note 128, at 26 (providing a table with all the states that have a contributing to the 
delinquency of a minor statute). 
134 Some of the most common applications of the statutes include juveniles’ failure to 
observe a city curfew, selling liquor, and illegal operation of a motor vehicle.  See People v. 
Walton, 161 P.2d 498 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1945); People v. Ferello, 268 P. 915 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1928); Reeves v. State, 143 S.E. 462 (Ga. Ct. App. 1928).  In Walton, the ordinances 
imposed a criminal penalty on the parents of a juvenile under sixteen who allowed the 
“minor to remain, stroll upon, use, loiter on or be upon any street or public place between 
the hours of 9 p.m. and 4 a.m. of the following day, unless accompanied by an adult having 
the care and custody of such minor, or unless the minor had in his possession a permit 
issued by the sheriff showing the necessity of such minor to so use such street or public 
place.”  Walton, 161 P.2d at 500.  Walton’s son was a sixteen-year-old who was out on the 
street between the hours indicated in the ordinance.  Id. at 499.  Subsequently, Walton was 
charged with a violation of the ordinance.  Id.  In Ferello, the mother was convicted of 
contributing to the delinquency of her minor daughter for encouraging the daughter to sell 
liquor.  Ferello, 268 P. at 916.  Similarly, in Reeves, the court upheld the mother’s indictment 
for a misdemeanor that resulted from their thirteen-year-old’s illegal operation of a motor 
vehicle.  Reeves, 143 S.E. at 462.  The father was not with the child, however, the mother was 
a passenger in the car.  Id.  Therefore, the presumption was that the mother knew that her 
child was not legally licensed to drive and that the mother aided and abetted in her son’s 
commission of a crime.  Id.; see also Ala. State Bar v. Quinn, 926 So. 2d 1018 (Ala. 2005) 
(disbarring Quinn, an attorney, based on his conviction of a serious crime, to wit causing 
delinquency by smoking marijuana with minors); State v. J.L. 945 So. 2d 884, 889 (La. Ct. 
App. 2006) (upholding the defendants conviction for contributing to the delinquency of a 
minor based on the performance of a sexually immoral act); State v. Ramirez, No. 13-04-30, 
13-04-31, 2005 WL 696868 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005); State v. Rayfield, 631 S.E.2d 244 (S.C. 2006) 
(defendant was convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a minor). 
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contributing statute, parents must possess the necessary mental state, 
such as influencing, helping, or soliciting delinquents to be liable.135   
Additionally, victims may institute a civil suit against a delinquent’s 
parents.136  Common law, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and state 
statutes, each address the issue of holding parents responsible for the 
misconduct of juveniles.137  Historically, common law did not allow 
victims to recover against juvenile offenders’ parents for juveniles’ 
intentional acts.138  However, exceptions to this rule have evolved.139  
Parents may be held liable for their minors’ misconduct if the parents 
either acted or failed to act.140  Absent participation, liability could be 
imposed on parents based on master-servant or principle-agent 
relationships between the parents and juveniles.141  But a suit could not 
be brought against the juveniles in an individual capacity.142  Rather, in 
                                                 
135 Brank et al., supra note 128, at 10-11; Chapin, supra note 106, at 639; Kourie, supra note 
133, § 4; see Ind. Code § 35-46-1-8(a) (2005) (providing that “[a] person at least eighteen (18) 
years of age who knowingly or intentionally encourages, aids, induces, or causes a person 
less than eighteen (18) years of age to commit an act of delinquency (as defined by IND. 
CODE § 31-37-1 or § 31-37-2) commits contributing to delinquency, a Class A 
misdemeanor”). 
136 Davidson, supra note 85, at 26. 
137 B. C. Ricketts, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statutes Making Parents Liable for 
Torts Committed by Their Minor Children, 8 A.L.R. 3D 612 (2005). 
138 Harris v. Traini, 759 N.E.2d 215, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).  The foundation of common 
law was the refusal to find liability without fault.  Gilbert Geis & Arnold Binder, Sins of 
Their Children: Parental Responsibility for Juvenile Delinquency, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 303, 309 (1991); see Bebry v. Zanauskas, 841 A.2d 282, 286 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004) 
(reiterating that common law does not impose vicarious liability on the parents for the torts 
of their minors); Jeffrey L. Skaare, Note, The Development and Current Status of Parental 
Liability for the Torts of Minors, 76 N.D. L. REV. 89, 92 (2000) (discussing the historical roots of 
the common law tradition); see also Chapin, supra note 106, at 629-30 (providing the 
common law limitations on parental tort liability). 
139 See supra note 138 and accompanying text (describing the common law exceptions). 
140 More specifically, common law allowed recovery against parents “(1) where the 
parent entrusts the child with an instrumentality which, because of the child’s lack of age, 
judgment, or experience, may become a source of danger to others; (2) where the child 
committing the tort is acting as the servant or agent of its parents; (3) where the parent 
consents, directs, or sanctions the wrongdoing; and (4) where the parent fails to exercise 
control over the minor child although the parent knows or with due care should know that 
injury to another is possible.”  Wells v. Hickman, 657 N.E.2d 172, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).  
Also, common law imposed liability due to the failure to act when the parents were aware 
of the child’s dangerous propensities and failed to exercise reasonable control over the 
children to prevent misconduct.  Ricketts, supra note 137, § 1(a); see Chapin, supra note 106, 
at 629-30. 
141 South ex rel. South v. McCarter, 119 P.3d 1, 8 (Kan. 2005).  Common law rejected the 
imposition of liability based on the existence of a parent child relationship.  Ricketts, supra 
note 137, § 1(a). 
142 Davidson, supra note 85, at 26. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 4 [2007], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss4/8
2007] Civil Penalty Enhancements 1715 
contrast to common law, but similar to the current trend in statutes, the 
Restatement focuses on the parental duty to control juveniles.143   
Parental liability statutes focus on encouraging parents to supervise 
their juveniles and reduce juvenile delinquency.144  Many states impose 
                                                 
143 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (2005).  The Restatement provides: 
A parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his 
minor child as to prevent it from intentionally harming others or from 
so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to 
them, if the parent (a) knows or has reason to know that he has the 
ability to control his child, and (b) knows or should know of the 
necessity and opportunity for exercising such control. 
Id.  However, some parents are not able to control their children.  Davidson, supra note 85, 
at 29.  The inability to control one’s minor is an ongoing debate which questions the value 
of parental liability laws.  Id. 
144 The phenomena of enacting statutes to provide redress against parents for victims of 
juvenile crime started in Hawaii in 1846. HAW. REV. STAT. § 577-3.5 (2004); Andrew C. 
Gratz, Comment, Increasing the Price of Parenthood: When Should Parents Be Held Civilly Liable 
for the Torts of Their Children?, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 169, 190 (2002).  Over time, states adopted 
similar statutes that added elements to Hawaii’s, such as Louisiana’s limitation on the 
amount of damages recoverable from the parents.  Gratz, supra, at 190.  Next, Louisiana 
enacted a vicarious liability statute that was in direct conflict with common law.  Id.  The 
relevant Louisiana statute provides, “[t]he father and the mother and, after the decease of 
either, the surviving parent, are responsible for the damage occasioned by their minor or 
unemancipated children, residing with them, or placed by them under the care of other 
persons, reserving to them recourse against those persons.”  LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 
2318 (2004).  The statutory language appeared to impose strict liability on parents, 
however, judgments entered against the parents indicated that an element of willful or 
negligent conduct of the minor is required to obtain damages.  Ricketts, supra note 137, 
§ 5(a); see Ryle v. Potter, 413 So. 2d 649, 651 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (imposing strict liability on 
parents of a minor who shot a B-B gun at a friend who sustained serious head injuries); 
Polk v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 115 So. 2d 399 (La. Ct. App. 1958) (holding the minor’s 
father liable for the negligent acts of his minor child, utilizing a dangerous instrumentality); 
see also ALA. CODE § 6-5-380 (2005) (liability of parents for destruction of property by 
minor); ALASKA STAT. § 34.50.020 (2005) (liability for destruction of property by minors); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Ann. § 12-661 (2005) (liabilities of parents or legal guardians for malicious 
or willful misconduct of minors); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-25-102 (West 2005) (parental 
liability); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.1 (West 2005) (liability of parents and guardians for willful 
misconduct of minor); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-107 (2005) (damages for destruction or 
bodily injury caused by minors); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572 (2005) (parental liability for 
torts of minors); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 6105 (2005) (liability of parent, guardian or 
employer for negligence of minor); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.24 (2005) (civil action against 
parents); GA. CODE. ANN. § 51-2-3 (2005) (liability of parent or guardian for willful torts by 
minor children); HAW. REV. STAT. § 577-3.5 (2004) (property damage, parental 
responsibility); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-210 (2005) (recovery of damages for economic loss 
willfully caused by minor); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 115/3 (2005) (parental responsibility law); 
IND. CODE § 34-31-4-1 (2005) (limited liability of parents for damages caused by child); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 613.16 (West 2005) (parental responsibility for actions of children); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 38-120 (2004) (recovery from parents for malicious or willful acts by certain 
children); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.180 (West 2005) (financial penalty when children 
found delinquent); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 2318 (2004) (acts of minor); ME. REV. STAT. 
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liability on the parents when juveniles act intentionally, willfully, or 
maliciously.145  These statutes resemble a form of strict liability because 
the parents are liable regardless of whether they acted reasonably.146  In 
some situations, liability is imposed based on the parents’ knowledge of 
misconduct.147  However, the scope of liability varies because some states 
                                                                                                             
ANN. tit. 14, § 304 (2005) (liability of parents or legal guardians for damage by children); 
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-28 (West 2005) (liability for acts of child); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231 § 85G (West 2005) (parents’ liability for willful acts of minor 
children); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2913 (West 2005) (malicious or willful destruction 
of property by minors); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 540.18 (West 2005) (damage by minor, 
responsibility of parent, guardian, and minor); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 94-13-2 (West 2005) 
(child’s property damage, parental liability); MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.045 (West 2005) (parent 
or guardian liable for damages by minor); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-237 (2005) (destruction 
of property by minor); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-801 (2005) (destruction of property); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 41.470 (2005) (imposition of liability for minor’s willful misconduct); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2A:53A-15 (West 2005) (liability of parent or guardian for willful destruction of 
property by infant under eighteen); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-27 (West 2005) (injury to 
person or destruction of property); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-112 (McKinney 2005) (liability 
of parents and legal guardians having custody of an infant for certain damages caused by 
such infant); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-538.1 (West 2005) (strict liability for damage to 
person or property by minors); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-39 (2003) (parental responsibility 
for minor children); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.70 (West 2005) (parental liability for 
minor child’s acts); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10 (West 2005) (recovery of damages by 
political subdivisions from parents of children under age of eighteen); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 30.198 (West 2003) (parental liability); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5502 (West 2005) 
(liability of parents); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-3 (2004) (liability of parents for torts of minors); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-8940 (2004) (civil liability for injury to state property); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 25-5-15 (2005) (parental liability for willful acts of child); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-
101 (West 2005) (damages for personal injuries or destruction of property); TEX. FAM. CODE 
ANN. § 41.001 (Vernon 2005) (liability of parents for conduct of child); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-11-20 (West 2005) (liability of parent or legal guardian); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 901 
(2004) (parents’ liability for damages); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-44 (West 2005) (action against 
parent for damage to private property by minor); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.190 (West 
2005) (action against parent for willful injury to person or property by minor); W. VA. 
CODE. ANN. § 55-7A-2 (West 2005) (parental liability for willful, malicious or criminal acts 
of children); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.035 (West 2005) (parental liability for acts of minor 
child); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-203 (2005) (parental liability for property damage of certain 
minors). 
145 See generally 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 115/3 (2005) (providing that “[t]he parent or legal 
guardian of an unemancipated minor who resides with such parent or legal guardian is 
liable for actual damages for the willful or malicious acts of such minor . . . .”); Thompson 
v. Park River Corp., 830 N.E.2d 1252, 1256 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).  The Ohio Court of 
Appeals refused to hold the parents liable for the acts of their minor child because there 
was no indication that the child acted willfully and maliciously.  Thompson, 830 N.E.2d at 
1265. 
146 Brank et al., supra note 128, at 3.  Victims can recover against parents without proving 
that the parents were at fault.  Id.  Further, the parents cannot “argue that they attempted to 
supervise their child properly.”  Id. at 3-4. 
147 See Stewart v. Swartz, 106 N.E. 719 (Ind. Ct. App. 1914).  The court held a parent liable 
under the Indiana parental responsibility statute for the child’s intentional placement of a 
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hold parents responsible for property damage, personal injuries, or 
both.148  Other differences in the scope of liability include the amount of 
damages recoverable from parents and the maximum age of juveniles for 
which parents may be accountable.149  Statutes of different states provide 
different minimum ages but almost all statutes do not extend liability 
over age seventeen.150  Despite the variations of the statutes among the 
                                                                                                             
rope across a street when the parent knew of the child’s actions.  Id. at 720.  In Shepard by 
Shepard v. Porter, 679 N.E.2d 1383 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), the court refused to impose liability 
under the parental responsibility statute because the parents were unaware of the son’s 
propensity to start fires.  Id. at 1389. 
148 Gratz, supra note 144, at 190.  Some statutes provide liability for personal injuries, 
property damage, or both.  Id.; see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.70 (West 2005) (providing 
recovery for both property and personal injuries).  But see MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-13-2 (2005) 
(allowing recovery specifically for property damage without mentioning recovery for 
personal injures suffered). 
149 Gratz, supra note 144, at 191.  Texas allows parents to be held liable up to $25,000.  TEX. 
FAM. CODE ANN. § 41.002 (Vernon 2005); see also IND. CODE § 34-31-4-1 (2005) (providing 
that the maximum amount of recovery is $5,000 for each separate incident against more 
than one person); Parent and Child, IND. L. ENCYCL., 2005, § 37; Brank et al., supra note 128, 
at 19 (indicating that the amount of damages recoverable under each state’s statute 
imposing civil liability on parents); Chapin, supra note 106, at 632 (stating that the average 
amount recoverable against parents is $2,500).  Another variation among parental liability 
statutes includes requiring parents to attend parenting classes or imposing a term of 
imprisonment.  Tyler et al., supra note 86, at 14. 
150 See D.C. CODE § 16-2301(4) (2005) (defining a minor as an individual under age 21); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 304 (2005) (imposing liability on parents when the child is 
between 7 and 17); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-237 (2005) (indicating that liability is impose 
on parents for a person under the age of 18); TEX. FAM CODE. ANN. § 41.001 (Vernon 2005) 
(providing the range for the imposition of liability on parents is 10-18); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 8.01-44 (West 2005) (which does not provide an age range, instead it imposes parental 
liability for the acts of a minor).  Ironically, South Dakota has a statute that imposes liability 
and another statute that abrogates parental liability.  See Miller v. Stevens, 256 N.W. 152, 
154 (S.D. 1934) (holding that the sole existence of the parent child relationship does not 
justify imposing liability on the parents for the misconduct of a minor).  South Dakota’s 
parental liability statute provides: 
Any person, firm, association, private or public corporation, including 
the State of South Dakota and its political subdivisions, suffering 
damages to real, personal, or mixed property, or personal injury, 
through the malicious and willful act or acts of a minor child or 
children under the age of eighteen years while residing with their 
parents, shall have therefor a cause of action against and recover of the 
parents of such child or children. In each case the amount of recovery 
against one or both of the parents shall be limited to actual damages of 
fifteen hundred dollars and the taxable court costs, and does not apply 
to damages proximately caused through the operation of a motor 
vehicle by the minor child or children. If the issue is disputed, any 
determination that a parent is not responsible for the full amount of 
actual damages and costs authorized by this section shall be justified in 
a specific finding, in writing or on the record. 
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states, all of the statutes maintain a common goal—to reduce juvenile 
delinquency.151  However, parental liability laws must first withstand 
constitutional scrutiny before they can achieve the desired goal.152 
2. The Constitutionality of Parental Liability Statutes 
Parental liability statutes are the legal reaction to reducing juvenile 
delinquency, but such laws are not a viable solution unless the statutes 
are upheld against challenges under the Due Process and Equal 
Protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution and under state 
constitutions.153  In general, attempts to challenge the constitutionality of 
parental liability statutes are unsuccessful.154  In Florida, the argument 
that parental liability statutes violate substantive due process provisions 
of the Constitution and respective state constitutions was rejected in 
Stang v. Waller.155  In Stang, the court indicated that the statute met the 
requirements inherent in substantive due process and was not 
unreasonable or arbitrary, but rather was a reasonable means to achieve 
a legitimate state goal.156  Specifically, the court further emphasized that 
reducing juvenile delinquency through parental liability statutes was a 
legitimate state interest.157   
Parental liability statutes have also withstood Equal Protection 
challenges.158  For example, a Nebraska statute was upheld because the 
                                                                                                             
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-15 (2005).  But see id. § 25-5-14.  South Dakota’s statute 
abrogating parental liability states that “[e]xcept as provided by § 25-5-15, neither parent 
nor child is answerable as such, for the act of the other.”  Id. 
151 Chapin, supra note 106, at 631; Thurman, supra note 84, at 99. 
152 See infra notes 153-61 and accompanying text (providing cases that involved 
unsuccessful challenges to parental liability laws based on the Due Process and Equal 
Protection clauses of the United States Constitution and the constitution of the respective 
state). 
153 See infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text (providing an unsuccessful challenge to 
Florida’s parental liability statute based on the substantive due process clause of the United 
States Constitution and Illinois constitution); infra notes 158-60 and accompanying text 
(describing an unsuccessful challenge to Nebraska’s parental liability law based on the 
Equal Protection clause of the United States Constitution and Nebraska constitution). 
154 Vanthournout v. Burge, 387 N.E.2d 341, 343 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Skaare, supra note 138, 
at 103. 
155 415 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Skaare, supra note 138, at 105-06. 
156 Stang, 415 So. 2d at 123-24; Skaare, supra note 138, at 105. 
157 Stang, 415 So. 2d at 124; Skaare, supra note 138, at 105. 
158 In Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, the plaintiff sought to recover damages 
pursuant to the state’s parental liability statute from the defendants because their son set 
fire to the plaintiff’s property.  443 N.W.2d 566, 569 (Neb. 1989).  The plaintiff alleged that 
the statute violated the Equal Protection clauses of both the Federal and Nebraska 
Constitutions.  Id. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 4 [2007], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss4/8
2007] Civil Penalty Enhancements 1719 
defendants failed to demonstrate that there was not a rational basis to 
treat parents differently depending on whether juveniles caused 
personal injury or property damage.159  The court stated that parental 
liability statutes are rationally related to the goals of compensating 
victims and eliminating juvenile delinquency.160  Subsequently, parental 
liability laws like hate crime legislation and penalty enhancement 
statutes will almost always withstand constitutional scrutiny; however 
there is an inconsistency among the laws and a necessity to modify 
existing parental liability laws.161  
The history of hate crime legislation indicates that it may be 
necessary to distinguish hate crime from other violent crime and subject 
hate crime offenders to an increased penalty.162  Further, parental 
                                                 
159 Id. at 572.  The argument was that the parental liability statute created a classification 
because it limited the amount of personal damages recoverable against parents but not the 
amount of property damages recoverable.  Id. at 569-70.  The Nebraska parental liability 
statute provides that: 
The parents shall be jointly and severally liable for the willful and 
intentional infliction of personal injury to any person or destruction of 
real and personal property occasioned by their minor or 
unemancipated children residing with them, or placed by them under 
the care of other persons; Provided, that in the event of personal injuries 
willfully and intentionally inflicted by such child or children, damages 
shall be recoverable only to the extent of hospital and medical 
expenses incurred but not to exceed the sum of one thousand dollars 
for each occurrence. 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-801 (2005).  However, there was not a fundamental right at issue, so 
the statute was only subject to rational basis review.  Cox, 443 N.W.2d at 570. 
160 Cox, 443 N.W.2d at 570; Hayward v. Ramick 285 S.E.2d 697, 699 (Ga. 1982); Alber v. 
Nolle, 645 P.2d 456 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982); Buie v. Longspaugh, 598 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1980); Watson v. Gradzik, 373 A.2d 191 (Conn. C.P. 1977).  In Distinctive, the 
defendants also challenged the statute’s imposition of vicarious liability based on the due 
process clauses of the Federal and State Constitution.  Cox, 443 N.W.2d at 572.  However, 
the court rejected the challenge because imposing full or partial responsibility on the 
parents is similarly a reasonable means to achieve a legitimate state interest.  Id.  In Bryan v. 
Kitamura, 529 F. Supp. 394 (D. Haw. 1982), the court held that vicarious liability did not 
infringe on a parent’s due process rights.  Id. at 398-400.  Notably, parents have a 
fundamental right to control the upbringing of their children and do not commit a crime 
for raising a juvenile to be a racist.  See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (establishing 
that the right of parents to control the upbringing of their juvenile is a fundamental right); 
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).  However, subjecting parents to civil liability for juvenile 
misconduct should encourage parents to appropriately exercise their fundamental right to 
control the upbringing of their juvenile. 
161 See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text (including constitutional challenges to 
penalty enhancement statutes). 
162 See supra note 60 and accompanying text (providing an enhanced penalty statute for 
hate crime offenders). 
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liability laws imply that encouraging parents to supervise juveniles is a 
legitimate reason to subject parents to liability for juvenile crime.163  
Therefore, an enhanced penalty for parents of juvenile hate crime 
offenders may be appropriate when an additional criminal punishment 
is already imposed on hate crime offenders.164  Part III analyzes the 
addition of an enhanced penalty to parental liability laws when juveniles 
commit hate crime.165   
III.  PARENTS SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO A PENALTY ENHANCEMENT WHEN 
THEIR JUVENILE COMMITS A HATE CRIME 
At trial, Hannah and James each receive an enhanced penalty for the 
hate crime they committed out of their hatred for Catholics and 
homosexuals.166  Hannah’s and James’s victims bring civil suits against 
their parents to compensate for the juveniles’ willful and wanton 
misconduct.167  However, Hannah’s and James’s victims discover that 
the existing parental liability statute failed to reflect the severity of hate 
crime and do not provide for an increased penalty against Mr. and Mrs. 
Smith and Mr. and Mrs. Jenkins.168  As a result, these laws have failed to 
appropriately punish and possibly prevent future hate crimes. 
Part III of this Note explains why an enhanced civil penalty for 
parental liability is necessary when juveniles commit hate crime.169  
Specifically, Part III.A analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of hate 
crime legislation and penalty enhancement statutes, while Part III.B 
addresses the current benefits of parental liability laws.170  Part III.C. 
explores the current defects of parental liability laws and Part III.D 
highlights the flaws of such laws as applied to parents of juvenile hate 
                                                 
163 See supra Part II.D (indicating that the purpose of parental liability is to encourage 
parents to supervise juvenile delinquents). 
164 See infra Part IV.A (adding a civil penalty enhancement to existing parental liability 
laws for parents of juvenile hate crime offenders). 
165 See infra Part III. 
166 See supra note 70 and accompanying text (providing objective criteria to help 
determine whether the crime was committed because of a bias). 
167 See supra note 145 and accompanying text (indicating that victims can bring a suit 
against a juvenile’s parents pursuant to the parental responsibility statute when the 
juvenile acts intentionally, willfully, or maliciously). 
168 See infra Part IV (adding an additional penalty to exiting parental liability laws for 
parents of juvenile hate crime offenders). 
169 See infra Part III. 
170 See infra Part III.A (establishing that hate crime laws are necessary to reflect the 
severity of hate crime and more appropriately punish hate crime offenders); infra Part III.B 
(providing that parental liability laws are necessary to encourage parents to supervise 
juveniles, but inappropriately reflect the severity of juvenile hate crime). 
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crime offenders.171  Finally, Part III.E explains why parents should be 
subject to an increased penalty when their juveniles commit hate 
crime.172   
A. Strengths of Hate Crime and Penalty Enhancement Legislation 
Independent legislation for hate crime is necessary to demonstrate 
that hate crime is distinguishable from other violent crime.173  Enhanced 
penalties are necessary to provide a punishment proportional to the 
damage inflicted by hate crime.174  Specifically, enhanced penalties more 
appropriately reflect the disproportionate effects of hate crime.175  
Statutes that merely define hate crime as a stand-alone crime fail to 
impose a punishment that mirrors the offense.176  Hate crime victims 
suffer increased psychological and physical effects compared to victims 
of ordinary battery.177  The surrounding community also experiences 
increased trauma following a hate crime—heightened disturbances that 
are absent after the commission of a simple battery.178  Subjecting hate 
crime offenders to the same law or punishment as offenders who commit 
battery is a blatant disregard of the inherent severity of hate crime.179 
Because hate crime is more devastating than other violent crimes, the 
punishment, to be proportionate, must be correspondingly more 
severe.180  Increased sentences function as deterrents because hate crime 
                                                 
171 See infra Part III.C (advocating a change in parental liability laws). 
172 See infra Part III.E. 
173 See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (providing state statutes that define hate 
crime as a new crime and provide a separate penalty).  The failure to provide a civil 
remedy or statute that criminalizes hate crimes constitutes a legislature’s acceptance of 
crime against a particular religion or characteristic, such as race.  Gellman, supra note 28, at 
341.  But see Anne B. Ryan, Comment, Punishing Thought: A Narrative Deconstructing the 
Interpretive Dance of Hate Crime Legislation, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 123, 143 (2001) (arguing 
that hate crime offenders should only be punished for the underlying offense and not for 
the bias motivation). 
174 See infra notes 180-86 and accompanying text (analyzing the strengths of enhanced 
penalties). 
175 See supra Part II.B.1 (describing state hate crime penalty enhancement statutes). 
176 See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (providing an example of a statute that 
defines a hate crime as a new crime). 
177 See supra notes 28-33 (presenting the psychological effects that hate crime victims 
suffer). 
178 See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text (providing increased effects suffered by 
the community after a hate crime). 
179 See supra Part II.A.2 (explaining that hate crime is more severe than other violent 
crime). 
180 FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN LAW 9-10 
(1999); McCoy, supra note 28, at 650-55; Wang, supra note 73, at 52-53; Konor Cormier, 
Comment, Increase the Peace Means Increase the Penalty?: The Impact of the James Byrd, Jr. Hate 
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offenders are less likely to feel remorse and more likely to be repeat 
offenders.181  Statistics from Wisconsin, a state that has a penalty 
enhancement statute, are indicative of this notion.182  Specifically, the 
number of hate crime offenses regularly exceeded thirty-nine from 1994-
2001, but from 2002-2004, the number never surpassed its earlier high of 
thirty nine offenses and has remained steady, demonstrating the overall 
deterrent effect of penalty enhancement statutes.183  Enhanced penalty 
statutes further protect the public via increased periods of 
incarceration.184  Such increases are necessary to promote a sense of 
security, and are justified by a decrease in the social harms of retaliation, 
a breakdown in community cohesiveness, and disassociation among 
society.185  Enhanced penalties also meet the goal of retribution because 
they convey society’s disapproval of hate crime.186   
                                                                                                             
Crimes Act in Texas, 34 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 343, 348-49 (2003).  In In re Joshua H., 17 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 291, 299-300 (Ct. App. 1994), the court stated that: 
The “basis” for punishing violent crimes directed against members of a 
racial, religious, or other specified group more severely than randomly 
inflicted violent crimes is that such crimes inflict greater injury upon 
the victim and society at large and existing criminal statutes and 
penalties have been inadequate to stop them.  This is “the very reason” 
those particular acts of violence are additionally punishable. 
Id. 
181 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 20, at 24-25. 
182 See infra note 183 and accompanying text (demonstrating the deterrent effect a penalty 
enhancement statute has on the prevalence of hate crime). 
183 Specifically, the prevalence of hate crime in Wisconsin, a state that has a hate crime 
penalty enhancement statute, has never exceeded sixty-eight offenses in a single year.  
OFFICE OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS CENTER CRIME AND ARRESTS IN 
WISCONSIN: HATE CRIME 111, 212 (2005), available at http://oja.state.wi.us/docview.asp? 
docid=4191&locid=97 (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).  Wisconsin’s penalty enhancement statute 
when into effect May 3, 1988.  WIS. STAT. § 939.645 (2005).  Wisconsin experienced the most 
hate crime in 1992 and the least in 1993.  Id.  However, the state experienced 41 incidents in 
1991, 68 incidents in 1992, 20 incidents in 1993, 39 incidents in 1994, 54 incidents in 1995, 42 
incidents in 1996, 57 incidents in 1997, 58 incidents in 1998, 50 incidents in 1999, 51 
incidents in 2000, 62 incidents in 2001, 35 incidents in 2002, 36 incidents in 2003, and 39 
incidents in 2004.  Id.  For a comparison to a state with a larger population, Colorado 
experienced 123 incidents in 1996, 118 incidents in 1997, 124 incidents in 1998, 146 incidents 
in 1999, 98 incidents in 2000, 133 incidents in 2001, 96 incidents in 2002, 81 incidents in 2003, 
and 59 incidents in 2004.  Crime in Colorado, http://cbi.state.co.us/dr/cic2k4/ 
supplemental_reports/hate_crime.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).  Despite population 
differences, it is important to note that Colorado does not have an enhanced penalty statute 
for the commission of hate crimes that function to deter offenders from acting on a bias 
motivation.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-121 (2005) (bias-motivated crimes).  Instead it has a 
statute that treats a hate crime as a new crime.  Id. 
184 Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 20, at 15. 
185 Hurd & Moore, supra note 28, at 1091-92.  Some argue that those who retaliate deserve 
the punishment, but those who caused the retaliation do not deserve to be punished more.  
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Hate crime legislation has been upheld against numerous challenges, 
indicating that the laws are a constitutional means to achieve the desired 
goal of reducing hate crime.187  Hate crime laws can achieve the desired 
goal of ending hatred and do not punish thought.188  Penalty 
enhancement statutes appropriately punish hate crime offenders for 
conduct that is distinguishable from the actions of other violent crime 
offenders.189   
In addition, hate crime offenders and violent crime offenders should 
not be equally punished for their actions.190  Admittedly, although all 
offenders are equally responsible for their actions, hate crime and 
penalty enhancement statutes are necessary to reflect a central tenent of 
criminal law:  proportional punishment.191  Because hate crime is more 
severe than violent crime, the punishment should be harsher.192   
Hate crime legislation, consisting of an increased punishment for 
hate crime, should reduce the prevalence of hate crime, thereby 
                                                                                                             
Id.  Implicit in the second harm is that the failure to appropriately punish hate crime will 
result in a weakened society, including lessened order and civility.  Id.  However, this 
argument is questioned because ordinary crimes can have the same effect on community 
stability.  Id.  Finally, the effects of the last social harm depend on how society responds to 
hate crime.  Id.  Primarily, hate crime causes society to associate more closely with a 
particular sexuality, gender, or race.  Id. at 1094.  However, critics believe that hate crime 
laws contribute to social conflicts.  Ryan, supra note 173, at 143; Sullaway, supra note 28, at 
251.  Social conflicts cited include proving bias motivation because of the difficulty of 
demonstrating a connection between prejudicial attitudes and behaviors, “punishment of 
ideas and attitudes in violation of First Amendment rights, the elevation of hate motives 
above other criminal motives as more severe, the creation of a special victim class, the risk 
of providing mitigating factors by which an offender can argue for reduced penalties, and 
increased intergroup tension as a result of these laws.”  Sullaway, supra note 24, at 251. 
186 Grannis, supra note 40, at 222. 
187 See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text (providing constitutional challenges to 
hate crime legislation). 
188 Robert J. Corry, Jr., Burn this Article: It is Evidence in Your Thought Crime Prosecution, 4 
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 461, 487 (2000). 
189 See supra notes 173-79 and accompanying text (arguing that hate crime offenders 
deserve an enhanced penalty compared to other violent crime offenders). 
190 Anthony M. Dillof, The Importance of Being Biased, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1678, 1682 (2000).  
The argument is that an assault without a bias motivation is just as wrong as an assault 
committed because of a hatred for a particular race, religion or ethnicity.  Id. 
191 The proportional punishment argument is supported by states that increase the 
punishment as the severity of the offence increases.  States increase the punishment for a 
battery to reflect the severity of the offense.  For example, aggravated battery in Illinois is 
categorized as a Class one, two, or three felony depending on the amount of injury inflicted 
on the victim and the punishment increases accordingly.  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-4 
(2005). 
192 McCoy, supra note 28, at 650-52; see supra notes 28-41 (providing the increased effects 
of hate crime on victims and society). 
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decreasing the number of victims and communities that suffer from the 
heightened effects of hate crime.193  Similarly, parental liability laws that 
encourage parents to exert control over juveniles will likely lead to a 
reduction in juvenile hate crime when the law provides an appropriate 
punishment.194 
B. Current Benefits of Parental Liability Laws  
Parental liability laws encourage parental supervision and reduce 
juvenile delinquency because the amount of control parents exert on 
juveniles relates to the probability that juveniles may engage in willful 
and wanton misconduct.195  Additionally, because of parental liability 
laws, victims of juvenile crime are able to seek redress against the 
juveniles’ parents, and victims are protected from irresponsible and 
judgment proof delinquents.196   
Moreover, because a lack of parental control is a cause of juvenile 
hate crime, parental liability laws are necessary to encourage parents to 
supervise juveniles and help reduce juvenile hate crime.197  There are 
theories that attempt to explain juvenile delinquency, including hate 
crime that are classified as biological, anomie, cultural deviance, and 
control.198  These theories pose solutions that more appropriately address 
the cause of juvenile hate crime than parental liability laws.199  However, 
                                                 
193 See Grannis, supra note 40, at 197 (noting the effect increased punishment should have 
on hate crime, through “reduc[ing] the undesirable phenomenon and the resulting 
disproportionate victimization”); supra note 183 (showing the deterrent effect Wisconsin’s 
penalty enhancement statute has on hate crime offenders). 
194 See supra note 183 and accompanying text (providing that enhanced penalties have a 
deterrent effect and encourage compliance, thus, enhanced penalties may encourage 
parents to further supervise their children due to the threat of additional penalties); infra 
Part IV (adding an additional penalty to existing parental liability laws). 
195 See infra notes 197-224 and accompanying text (analyzing the parallels between the 
control theory and parental liability laws). 
196 See infra notes 225-29 and accompanying text (analyzing the strengths of current 
parental liability laws). 
197 Tyler et al., supra note 86, at 7; see infra notes 197-224 and accompanying text (further 
discussing the relationship between the control theory and parental liability laws). 
198 The biological theory proposes that there is a link between biological abnormalities 
and juvenile delinquency.  Chapin, supra note 106, at 665.  Another theory, the anomie 
theory, maintains that juveniles pursue illegitimate modes to obtain a legitimate result.  Id. 
at 666.  The cultural deviance theory provides that juveniles engage in delinquency, 
including hate crime, because juveniles associate with delinquent peers.  Id. at 667. 
199 Although parents may be a biological cause of juvenile delinquency, parental liability 
laws inadequately provide a solution to the biological theory.  Parents cannot change the 
biological makeup of their children, which is unlike their ability to exert more control over 
their children, which is exactly what parental liability laws seek to encourage.  A solution 
for the anomie theory’s explanation for juvenile delinquency would be educating juveniles 
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the control theory provides the social justification for parental liability 
laws—what the government views as the contributing factors of juvenile 
delinquency and juvenile hate crime—supervision, and control.200  
Parental liability laws are thus a legal solution, rooted in the control 
theory, for reducing juvenile hate crime.201   
More specifically, the control theory, through four elements, 
demonstrates that parental liability laws are necessary:  attachment, 
commitment, involvement, and belief.202  The first element, attachment, 
is the most important in illustrating the desirability for parental liability 
laws.203  It relates to the bonds juveniles have with their parents.204  A 
lack of support and identity results in adolescents’ use of prejudices “to 
project unacceptable feelings” resulting in “an intolerance of others and 
indignation at the attributed faults.”205  Hatred conveys the juveniles’ 
feelings of inadequacy due to an absence of parental attachment.206  The 
stronger the parental bonds, the easier it is for minors to develop 
identities, and the more control parents have over juveniles, the less 
                                                                                                             
about the legal means to obtain a desired result.  The education would teach a juvenile 
legitimate modes to obtain the desired result, such as working to buy a car instead of 
stealing the car.  Again, parental liability laws encourage control, which does not 
necessarily entail educating the delinquent juvenile.  Finally, parental liability laws 
inadequately provide a solution to the cultural deviance theory.  A somewhat simplified 
solution to this theory is to remove the child from his deviant peers.  This requires control, 
but the sequence of events appears inconsistent with parental liability laws.  The child is 
removed because the parents exerted control, but parental liability laws should not punish 
parents who exert control. 
200 The alternative question is whether or not the laws are effective and there is a lack of 
empirical, research strongly supporting either position.  Tyler et al., supra note 86, at 6.  
Opponents of the laws argue that the laws are counterproductive because they unfairly 
disadvantage the poor through imposing a fine on a family who struggles financially.  Id. at 
8.  Further, opponents argue there is no reason to punish parents for not controlling 
uncontrollable juveniles.  Id. at 6. 
201 See generally Chapin, supra note 106; Steinberg, supra note 24; Tyler et al., supra note 86; 
supra Part II.C.3 (explaining the theories of juvenile delinquency). 
202 See supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text (presenting the elements of the control 
theory). 
203 See supra note 116 and accompanying text (providing that a juvenile learns socially 
acceptable behavior from the juvenile’s parents). 
204 Steinberg, supra note 24, at 985.  Juveniles need parents to discuss fears, 
apprehensions, and uncertainties inherent in adolescence.  Id.  Attachment also relates to 
the bonds between juveniles and teachers as well as juveniles and their peers.  Id. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. at 986-87; see Rand D. Conger, Social Control and Social Learning Models of Delinquent 
Behavior, 14 CRIMINOLOGY 17 (1976).  The research from this study reveals that “particular 
parental behaviors which influence the reinforcing value of the home appear to have the 
primary influence on delinquent behavior in the parent-child bond.”  Id.; see also 
Christopher A. Kierkus & Douglas Baer, A Social Control Explanation of the Relationship 
Between Family Structure and Delinquent Behaviour, 44 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 425 (2002). 
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likely juveniles will engage in delinquent behavior, including hate 
crime.207  Conversely, the weaker the bond, the more likely it is that 
juveniles will lack identities; the less control parents have over 
delinquents, the more likely it is that minors will participate in hate 
crime.208  Parents’ abilities to exert an appropriate amount of control over 
juveniles is a reflection of attachment between parents and their 
juveniles as well as a necessity for parental liability laws.209   
The second element, commitment, indicates that juveniles conform 
to laws because they are uncertain of the consequences.210  This element 
is the most difficult to reconcile with the necessity for parental liability 
laws because it is unclear why parents need to further supervise minors 
who refrain from engaging in hate crime.211  However, uncertainty of the 
consequences is not an absolute guarantee for abstention from juvenile 
crime.  Further, continuous parental commitment to supervision 
reinforces juveniles’ commitments to conformity and avoidance of 
behavior with consequences; it may also further encourage juveniles to 
behave in socially acceptable ways and recognize that hatred is 
inherently immoral.212  Parents in particular are in a position to explain 
why it is wrong to hate, to describe the consequences of acting upon a 
bias motivation, to convey the effects hate crime has on victims and 
society, and to discuss why retaliation is not a solution to prior 
victimization.213  As a result, parental liability laws for juvenile hate 
crime are essential for minors because minors are inherently less mature 
than adults.214  These laws encourage parents to control juveniles, which 
                                                 
207 See C. Burt, The Causal Factors of Juvenile Crime, 3 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 1 (1923).  The results 
of the study revealed that the parent-child bond is an environmental factor that has a 
significant influence on the likelihood that juveniles will engage in delinquent behavior.  Id. 
208 See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text (addressing the attachment element of 
the control theory). 
209 See supra note 116 and accompanying text (learning how to behave appropriately in 
society depends on a juvenile’s attachment with peers, teachers, and parents). 
210 See supra note 118 and accompanying text (introducing the commitment element of the 
control theory). 
211 See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text (indicating that an educated juvenile is 
less likely to engage in criminal behavior); Part II.D.1 (providing that the purpose of 
parental liability laws is to encourage parents to supervise a juvenile delinquent). 
212 See supra note 118 and accompanying text (stating that commitment may include 
explaining and educating a juvenile about the consequences of inappropriate behavior). 
213 See supra notes 28-41 (expanding on the increased effects that a hate crime instills in 
the victim and society). 
214 See infra note 247 (indicating that parents need to be held liable for juvenile 
misconduct because a juvenile lacks the cognitive development that most adults possess). 
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require a certain level of commitment within parent-child 
relationships.215  
The third element, involvement, reduces juveniles’ free time.216  
Juveniles are less likely to engage in hate crime because of frustration 
and boredom when parents encourage involvement in extracurricular 
activities.217  In such a situation, juveniles acquire the social involvement 
necessary to understand the inaccuracy of stereotypes about various 
races, genders, and religions.218  An absence of involvement can 
represent a failure of parents to exert control and encourage parental 
supervision.219  
The last element of the control theory, belief, indicates that once 
juveniles become members of deviant subcultures they surrender 
previously held moral beliefs in favor of the prejudices held by the hate 
group.220  But juveniles would be less likely to look for acceptance in 
deviant peer groups and commit hate crime if parents would provide the 
necessary guidance and discipline.221  Parents who supervise adolescents 
are better able to monitor those with whom the juveniles associate.222  
Thus, the more parental control exerted, the less likely the minors will 
befriend others who possess racial, religious, or gender prejudices, and 
who are likely to engage in hate crime.223  Due to juveniles’ diminished 
responsibility and the desire to provide hate crime victims with redress, 
                                                 
215 See supra note 118 and accompanying text (addressing the commitment element of the 
control theory). 
216 See supra note 120 and accompanying text (addressing the benefits to participating in 
social activities). 
217 Steinberg, supra note 24, at 985. 
218 Id. 
219 See supra Part II.D.1 (providing that the primary goal of parental liability laws is to 
encourage parents to supervise juveniles because of the threat that the parents may be held 
liable). 
220 See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text (introducing the belief element of the 
control theory). 
221 See supra note 123 and accompanying text (indicating that juveniles who associate 
with deviant subcultures gradually accept and act on the prejudices of the corresponding 
groups). 
222 See Cheryl Ann Banachowski-Fuller, Peer Influences, Parental Bonds, School Bonds, 
and Perceived Peer Pressure to Commit Delinquent Behavior, 58 Dissertation Abstracts 
Int’l Section A: Humanities and Soc. Sci. 2398 (Dec. 1997) (North Carolina State University).  
Specifically, research indicates that “the effect of associating with many delinquent friends 
on perceived peer pressure is reduced if parents are supportive.”  Id. 
223 See supra Part II.C.3 (providing the theories of juvenile delinquency which include the 
biological, anomie, cultural deviance, and control). 
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the penalty should fall on the juveniles’ parents when juveniles engage 
in delinquency.224 
Parental liability laws are also highly beneficial for the victims of 
juvenile hate crime.225  The statutes place losses resulting from hate 
crimes on the parents instead of on the victims and protect the victims 
from juveniles that are less responsible and unable to satisfy a 
judgment.226  Parents are encouraged “[t]o exercise power or influence 
over” their children.227  Therefore, increased supervision leads to a 
decrease in “juvenile delinquency, vandalism, and malicious 
mischief.”228  Parental liability laws are also constitutional means that 
serve a government’s legitimate purpose of reducing juvenile 
delinquency.229  However, existing laws are defective.230   
C. Present Defects of Parental Liability Laws 
Specifically, despite the benefits of parental liability laws, further 
examination reveals inherent flaws.231  First, limits imposed on recovery 
                                                 
224 See supra notes 144-52 (addressing parental liability that allows victims to recover 
against a juvenile’s parents). 
225 See infra note 238 and accompanying text (indicating that parental liability laws allow 
victims to bring a suit for damages against the parents of juvenile delinquents to protect the 
victim from judgment proof juveniles). 
226 Wells v. Hickman, 657 N.E.2d 172 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Hyman v. Davies, 453 N.E.2d 
336 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Scott & Grisso, supra note 105, at 172.  Skaare argues that the best 
solution is to force the parents of juvenile delinquents to pay the victim’s damages rather 
than making the victim pay for the loss.  Skaare, supra note 138, at 107.  The legislative 
history of parental civil liability statutes is also indicative.  Brank et al., supra note 128, at 7.  
A Nebraska Senator noticed the necessity of a statute to reduce the amount of property 
damage when youth who destroyed a woman’s property were sent to rehab and the victim 
was without a remedy to repair the destroyed items.  Id.  Subsequently, a statute that 
provided parental liability for property damage provided redress and decreased property 
destruction.  Id. at 8. 
227 See Covell v. Olsen, 840 N.E.2d 555 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (noting that parents can be 
held liable for negligent supervision because the parents have a duty to prevent juveniles 
from intentionally or negligently injuring others); see also Hyman, 453 N.E.2d at 338; Gratz, 
supra note 152, at 190 (stating that parental responsibility statutes may “curb juvenile 
crime”); supra note 152 and accompanying text (providing the parental liability laws of the 
states). 
228 Skaare, supra note 138, at 107; see Sutherland v. Roth, 407 So. 2d 139, 140 (Ala. App. 
1981). 
229 Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, 443 N.W.2d 556, 572 (Neb. 1989). 
230 See infra notes 231-34 and accompanying text (providing the defects in existing 
parental liability laws). 
231 Thurman, supra note 84, at 106.  Other critiques include that the laws will increase the 
number of emancipated minors when parents relinquish parental rights because of an 
inability to control delinquents.  Id.  The law does not guarantee that the imposition of a 
penalty on parents for juvenile misconduct will cause parents to exert more control over 
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cause parental liability laws to become less effective.232  Imposing a 
$5,000 judgment against parents of juvenile hate crime offenders who 
struggle to provide for their family will not further encourage parents to 
supervise their juveniles.233  Likewise, the problem is not solved when 
parents only pay damages without exerting more control over their 
juvenile hate crime offenders.234  
D. Flaws of Parental Liability Laws as Applied to Parents of Juvenile Hate 
Crime Offenders 
Existing parental liability laws are ineffective and inadequately 
encourage parents of juvenile hate crime offenders to further 
supervise.235  Currently, parental liability statutes limit recovery to a 
certain amount of damages, such as $2,500, regardless of the crime 
committed by juveniles.236  Yet, the statutes fail to reflect the inherent 
severity of hate crime as compared to violent crime already recognized 
in enhanced penalty hate crime statutes. 237   
Subjecting parents of juvenile hate crime offenders to the same 
parental liability laws when their juveniles commit an assault or battery 
inadequately redresses a victim for the juveniles’ commission of a hate 
                                                                                                             
delinquents.  Davidson, supra note 95, at 24; see Brank et al., supra note 128, at 16-17 
(presenting additional arguments in opposition to parental liability laws). 
232 Davidson, supra note 85, at 26.  For example, some statutes only allow victims to 
recover against parents for property damage or personal injuries.  Id.; see ALASKA STAT. 
§ 34.50.020 (2004); HAW. REV. STAT. § 577-3.5 (2005) (liability for destruction of property by 
minors). But see ALA. CODE § 6-5-380 (2005); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-661 (2005) 
(providing recovery for personal and property damage).  Also, as Tyler notes, there is no 
purpose to imposing a $5,000 fine on parents to hold them accountable for juvenile 
misconduct when the parents already struggling to provide for the family.  Tyler et al., 
supra note 86, at 8; see infra Part IV (providing that the penalty imposed should be tailored 
to the reason why there is a lack of control instead of simply imposing a fine). 
233 See supra notes 195-232; infra notes 234-83 (stating that an additional penalty that 
increased the amount of damages recoverable against parents of juvenile hate crime 
offenders will likely not further encourage parents to supervise juvenile hate crime 
offenders). 
234 Tyler et al., supra note 86, at 5. 
235 See infra notes 236-44 and accompanying text (discussing the flaws of existing parental 
liability laws). 
236 See supra note 145 and accompanying text (providing the text of a parental liability 
statute under which hate crime, although more severe than violent crime, can still be 
classified as willful and wanton conduct). 
237 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing enhanced penalties and why an increased sentence is 
necessary for the commission of a hate crime).  The belief is that the enhanced penalty will 
also function as a further deterrent to juvenile and adult commission of hate crime. 
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crime.238  Parents should be subject to a different penalty depending on 
whether their juveniles commit hate crime or other violent crime.239  
Enhanced penalties are necessary to reflect the notion that hate crime is 
different from other violent crime because of the increased effects hate 
crimes have on the victims and society.240  Increasing a penalty against 
parents would likely decrease the number of hate crimes committed by 
juveniles because penalty enhancements in general correlate to lower 
hate crime rates.241  To reflect the enhanced criminal hate crime penalty 
that seeks to function as a deterrent, parental liability laws should 
include similar recognition.242  However, imposing additional fines on 
parents who do not know how to properly parent their child or children 
inadequately addresses the problem.243  Instead, the more appropriate 
would be to require the parents to attend parenting classes to learn how 
to supervise and become better role models.244 
E. Application of an Enhanced Penalty to Parental Liability Laws for Juvenile 
Hate Crime 
Adult or juvenile hate crime offenders should receive heightened 
penalties to appropriately punish their actions, further deter bias 
                                                 
238 See Hurd & Moore, supra note 28, at 1134.  Hurd and Moore argued that the penalty 
for the commission of an assault was an insufficient punishment for the commission of an 
assault with a bias motivation, stating that “current penalties do not give highly culpable 
defendants their due.”  Id. at 1135. 
239 See infra Part IV.A (providing the text of the additional punishment). 
240 See supra Part II.A.1; supra Part II.B.1 and accompanying text (discussing enhanced 
penalties and why increased sentences are necessary for the commission of hate crime). 
241 See supra note 183 (demonstrating through Wisconsin’s hate crime statistics that 
enhanced penalty statutes function as a deterrent and reduce the prevalence of hate crime). 
242 See infra Part IV (adding a sentence enhancement feature to existing parental liability 
laws to reflect the severity of juvenile hate crime). 
243 See supra Part III.A (addressing the strengths and weaknesses of hate crime 
legislation). 
244 Requiring parents of juvenile hate crime offenders to attend parenting classes may 
teach parents the skills necessary to curb juvenile hate crime.  Chapin, supra note 106, at 
654.  California amended its “contributing to the delinquency of a minor” statute to require 
parents to exercise reasonable care, supervision, protection, and control over their minor 
child.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West 2006).  Subsequently, the City Attorney’s Office of Los 
Angeles has used the statute to force parents to attend parenting classes to reduce juvenile 
delinquency.  Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993); Chapin, supra note 106, at 654.  
The Los Angeles parental diversion program was maintained through public resources, not 
by the parents themselves.  Chapin, supra note 106, at 662.  Therefore, along with the 
additional penalty, parents of juvenile hate crime offenders that are required to attend 
parental training classes will not be responsible for the respective cost.  Id.; see infra Part IV 
(including parenting classes as one additional punishment). 
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motivations, and reflect the inherent severity of hate crime.245  However, 
to become whole, the juvenile hate crime victims’ only option is to bring 
a civil cause of action against the juveniles’ parents.246  Juveniles are not 
completely culpable for their actions, and among other causes of 
delinquency, parents are often to blame in some part for juvenile 
delinquency because of their lack of control over juvenile offenders.247  
Because hatred, such as racism and bigotry, is generally learned, parents 
that teach juveniles such hatred to the point it leads to violence should be 
held liable.248   
An enhanced penalty for parents is a law that more appropriately 
encourages parents to supervise juvenile hate crime offenders.249  
Ultimately, a parental liability law with an enhanced penalty against the 
parents more appropriately reflects and addresses the additional bias 
motivation inherent in the hate crime committed by juveniles.250   
IV.  ENHANCED PENALTY FOR PARENTS OF JUVENILE HATE CRIME 
OFFENDERS 
Penalty enhancement statutes correctly recognize that hate crimes 
are more severe than other violent crime and deserve increased 
punishment.251  However, current parental liability laws fail to reflect the 
inherent severity of hate crime punished within the criminal law.252  This 
Note proposes the addition of a penalty enhancement feature for parents 
of juvenile hate crime offenders.253 
                                                 
245 See supra Part II.B.  Steinberg notes that the “penalties for hate crime offenders must 
reflect the truly reprehensible nature of their acts.”  Steinberg, supra note 24, at 986. 
246 See supra Part II.D.1 (including the state parental liability statutes). 
247 See supra Part II.C.3 (proving various causes of and theories behind juvenile 
delinquency). 
248 Steinberg, supra note 24, at 979. 
249 See supra Part II.B (providing the states that enacted an enhanced penalty for the 
commission of a hate crime and examples of a state statute). 
250 See supra notes 152 and accompanying text (addressing parental liability laws and 
providing the parental liability laws of the fifty states). 
251 See supra Part II.B.1 (pointing out the increased severity of hate crime compared to 
other violent crime). 
252 See supra note 150 and accompanying text (allowing recovery for different amounts, 
depending on the state). 
253 See infra notes 254-58 (providing the text of the hate crime penalty enhancement 
feature). 
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A. Proposed Enhancement Feature 
The following penalty enhancement feature is a suggested addition 
to existing parental liability statutes to further encourage parents to 
supervise their juvenile and reduce juvenile hate crime. 254 
(A)  A parent, parents, or legal guardian of an 
unemancipated minor under the age of eighteen (18) is 
liable for actual damages to persons or property and is 
subject to an additional penalty if: 
(1)  the juvenile intentionally selected the victim 
because of the victim’s actual or perceived disability, 
gender, nationality, race or ethnicity, religion, sexual 
orientation, or association with a person or group 
with one or more of these actual or perceived 
characteristics;255 
(2) the additional penalty for juvenile’s crime is 
determined by: 
(a)  the amount of supervision the parent actually 
exerted over the juvenile; AND 
(b)  the age of the offender; 
(1)  twelve (12) years of age and under requires 
proof a preponderance of the evidence that the 
parents taught the hatred;  
(2)  thirteen (13) to fifteen (15) requires proof by 
clear and convincing evidence that the parents 
taught the hatred; 
(3)  sixteen (16) to seventeen (17) requires proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the parents 
taught the hatred. 
                                                 
254 The enhancement feature is based on CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.55 (West 2005) (defining 
a hate crime) and MO. REV. STAT. § 537.045 (2005) (parent or guardian liable for damages by 
minor).  The italicized text is the author’s contribution.  The first provision in the statute 
would solely subject the parents to liability for a juvenile’s ordinary crime.  The subsequent 
provision includes the enhancement feature to indicate that hate crime is distinct from 
violent crime and an additional punishment is necessary. 
255 The definition of a hate crime is taken from CAL. PENAL  CODE §  422.55 (West 2005), 
which is reflective of most statutes. 
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(B)  The punishment shall include one or more of the 
following:  
(1)  parenting classes;256 
(2)  family counseling;  
(3) educational classes; or257 
(4) additional fines. 
(C)  Upon a finding that the child is uncontrollable and 
continues to engage in delinquent behavior, the parents 
are exempt from the imposition of any penalty under 
this statute.258 
B. Commentary 
The proposed penalty enhancement feature adopts the standard 
definition of hate crime and establishes a separate provision to indicate 
that hate crime is distinct from violent crime.259  Like existing parental 
liability statutes, the enhancement does not preclude subjecting juveniles 
to a criminal punishment for the hate crime nor does it prevent parents 
from being held liable for their own negligence.260  The enhancement is 
                                                 
256 See supra note 244 and accompanying text (discussing parenting classes). 
257 See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.014 (Vernon 2005) (requiring hate crime 
offenders to attend education classes to familiarize and promote tolerance of different 
characteristics).  The enhancement feature includes educational classes because juveniles 
are not completely responsible for their actions.  Further, hate is a learned behavior 
commonly taught by parents.  If parents are taught tolerance, their children may also 
become more accepting. 
258 Id.  Texas’s statute provides that: 
On a finding by the juvenile court or probation department that a 
child’s parents or guardians have made a reasonable good faith effort 
to prevent the child from engaging in delinquent conduct or engaging 
in conduct indicating a need for supervision and that, despite the 
parents’ or guardians’ efforts, the child continues to engage in such 
conduct, the court or probation department shall waive any sanction 
that may be imposed on the parents or guardians at any sanction level. 
Id.  The addition of a similar provision to the enhancement feature should avoid imposing 
an additional penalty on parents whose minor is uncontrollable. 
259 See supra Part IV.A (providing the text of the sentence enhancement feature). 
260 See supra Part II.C (describing juvenile delinquency). 
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an addition to existing parental liability laws and will apply to all 
parents or legal guardians of juvenile hate crime offenders.261   
The additional penalty is determined by a combination of factors to 
reflect the severity of hate crime.262  The amount of supervision parents 
actually exert will help determine the appropriate additional sanction.263  
For example, if the parents did not supervise, an examination into the 
failure to exercise parental authority will determine the additional 
punishment.264  If the parents tried to supervise, further inquiry into why 
the attempt was unsuccessful will assist with the imposition of an 
appropriate increased penalty.265  Different levels of proof that the 
parents taught the hatred are required for different ages because parents’ 
accountability should change as minors mature and become more 
independent.266  Specifically, victims have the burden to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that parents taught their children twelve 
and under to hate.267  Preponderance of the evidence is the standard for 
children twelve and under because it is likely more probable than not 
that parents taught the juveniles to hate.268  However, the origin of 
hatred among juveniles thirteen through fifteen is less obvious, and as a 
result, the burden is increased to clear and convincing evidence.269  
Finally, the standard is beyond a reasonable doubt for juveniles sixteen 
and seventeen because it is less certain that parents, not outside 
influences or life experience, are the roots of a juvenile’s hatred.270  
                                                 
261 See supra note 254 and accompanying text (adding the enhancement feature to all civil 
parental liability laws). 
262 See infra text accompanying notes 262-71 (explaining how the additional penalty is 
determined). 
263 See supra notes 255-58 (providing possible additional penalties). 
264 See supra notes 256-57 (providing the possible additional punishments). 
265 See supra text accompanying note 256-57 (imposing an additional penalty of parenting 
classes, family counseling, educational classes or additional fines). 
266 See supra text accompanying notes 255-56 (providing that twelve years of age and 
under requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the parents taught the 
hatred). 
267 See supra text accompanying note 255 (providing that proof by a preponderance of the 
evidence is required for children twelve and under). 
268 Preponderance of the evidence is defined as “. . . superior evidentiary weight that, 
though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to 
incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 2004). 
269 Clear and convincing evidence is more than a preponderance but less than beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 596 (8th ed. 2004).  The standard requires that 
“[e]vidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain.”  
Id. 
270 Beyond a reasonable doubt “is that state of the case, which, after the entire 
comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in that 
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Therefore, the amount of supervision parents actually exerted and the 
juvenile’s age will help determine the additional penalty.271   
The enhanced penalty for parents of juvenile hate crime offenders 
includes alternative sanctions to address both the purpose and flaws of 
parental liability statutes, encouraging supervision, and increasing 
effectiveness.272  The additional penalty provides a solution that directly 
addresses the absence of supervision which allows juveniles to commit 
hate crimes.273  For example, to encourage supervision due to an inability 
to parent, the enhanced penalty will require the parents to attend 
parenting classes with the juvenile to assist in the development of solid 
parent-child relationships.274  For another family, an absence of control 
may be due to communication problems or unstable relationships 
between parents enabling the juvenile to associate with a deviant 
subculture.275  Therefore, family counseling may be an appropriate 
remedy to increasing supervision over juvenile hate crime offenders.276  
If a court determines that the parents taught the juveniles to hate, 
parents may be required to attend educational classes to promote 
tolerance for the targeted characteristic.277 
In addition to holding parents liable for damages for their own 
negligence, the enhanced penalty includes the possibility of additional 
damages.  However, the enhancement should not and is not intended to 
disadvantage the already disadvantaged by imposing an additional fine 
                                                                                                             
condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the 
truth of the charge.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1293-94 (8th ed. 2004). 
271 See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text (providing the various additional 
punishments). 
272 See supra Part III.B; Tyler et al., supra note 86, at 9-11 (pointing out the flaws and 
situations that contribute to the ineffectiveness of parental liability laws). 
273 Importantly, the statute seeks to encourage parents to exert an appropriate level of 
control over their children because studies indicate that this will lead to a reduction in 
juvenile delinquency.  Tyler et al., supra note 86, at 13.  However, juvenile delinquency 
increases at both ends of the spectrum, low and high levels of control.  Id. 
Attending parenting classes without juveniles only increases the juvenile’s ability to engage 
in delinquent behavior.  Id.  If the only parent of the house has to attend classes, again the 
juvenile is left unsupervised and able to engage in misconduct, which may further subject 
the parent to increased liability.  Id. at 2.  In the United States, some of the most common 
forms of punishment imposed in the under parental liability statutes include “compulsory 
counseling or education programs,”  money, or jail sentence.  Id. 
275 See supra Part IV.A (indicating that counseling may be an appropriate additional 
sanction for this situation). 
276 See supra Part IV.A (including counseling as an option for an additional punishment). 
277 See supra note 258 (providing the text of Texas’s statute that waives liability upon the 
finding of a parents good faith attempts to prevent a child from engaging in delinquency). 
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on parents who struggle to provide for the family.278  But an additional 
fine reflects the criminal law’s treatment of hate crime and may be 
appropriate in some situations or as a last resort. Nonetheless, limiting 
the additional penalty to those included in the enhancement feature 
addresses the flaws of current liability laws for parents of juvenile hate 
crime offenders.279 
Further, the increased penalty is consistent with the goal of 
encouraging parents to supervise their juveniles and reduce juvenile 
delinquency.280  The enhancement feature recognizes that some juveniles 
are entirely uncontrollable.281  Also, the statute would not encourage 
parents to supervise juveniles if the parents will continually be subject to 
an enhanced penalty because of uncontrollable juveniles.282  Therefore, 
the enhancement feature waives the penalty upon a finding that the 
juveniles were completely uncontrollable.283 
The penalty enhancement feature is meant to address major issues 
among hate crime legislation, penalty enhancement statutes, juvenile 
delinquency, and parental liability laws.  The statute is reflective of the 
severity of hate crime, the necessity of an increased punishment, the 
desire to reduce juvenile hate crime, and to further hold parents 
accountable for juvenile hate crime offenders. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Hate crime is inherently more demoralizing than other violent 
crimes.  Its offenders torture victims because of a prejudice against a 
characteristic beyond the victims’ control.  As a result, the surrounding 
                                                 
278 The enhancement feature is designed to address the flaws of parental liability laws 
pointed out by Tyler and increase the effectiveness of the laws.  For instance, the statute 
will not impose a $5,000 fine on a parent or parents who cannot provide food for the 
family.  Tyler et al., supra note 86, at 8.  Further the imposition of a fine is discouraged 
because the fine may not appropriately punish the family who is able to pay.  Specifically, 
“having economic resources can become a poor substitute for the love and affection that 
the delinquent child needs.”  Id. at 11. 
279 See supra Part IV.A (providing the only four possible additional penalties of the 
enhancement feature). 
280 See supra note 144 and accompanying text (indicating the purpose of parental liability 
laws). 
281 Juveniles are considered uncontrollable when the parents repeated good faith 
attempts to control the juveniles are unsuccessful.  Further, the statute is not meant to 
imply that bad children result from bad parents.  Tyler et al., supra note 86, at 5. 
282 See supra Part IV.A (including the text of the sentence enhancement feature). 
283 This notion is based on a Texas’s statute that waives sanctions on parents or 
guardians.  See supra note 285 (proving Texas’s waiver of parental liability upon a finding 
of good faith). 
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community is forced to conceal the targeted characteristic.  Therefore, 
enhanced penalty statutes are necessary to provide a punishment 
proportional to the crime.  Parental liability laws fail to include this 
recognition; in response, this Note proposes a penalty enhancement 
feature to correct the inherent flaws in current parental liability statutes.  
Enhanced penalties more appropriately reflect the severity of hate crime 
and provide a punishment that directly addresses the quality of 
supervision that allows juveniles to commit hate crime. 
For example, the enhancement feature more appropriately reflects 
the severity of Hannah’s and James’s hate crimes and encourages their 
parents to further supervise them.  The court applies the penalty 
enhancement feature to Mr. and Mrs. Smith and Mr. and Mrs. Jenkins.  
As a result, Mr. and Mrs. Smith attend educational classes because they 
taught Hannah a hatred for Catholics.  The classes expose Mr. and Mrs. 
Smith to Catholics in order to facilitate familiarity and acceptance that 
will be passed on to Hannah.  At the civil trial against Mr. and Mrs. 
Jenkins, the court imposes an additional fine and demands family 
counseling even though Mr. and Mrs. Jenkins did not teach James his 
hatred.  The additional fine reflects the enhanced penalty in criminal 
statutes and the family counseling should improve communication 
among the family and encourage James’s parents to supervise with 
whom James associates.  Hannah and James learned to hate, but because 
they learned to hate, they can also be taught to tolerate. 
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